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Part I
Overview
1

“The theme is that, after the explosion (in
both the positive and negative meaning of
the word) of the field in the 1970s, there
has been enormous progress and substan-
tial convergence. For a while – too long
a while – the field looked like a battle-
field. Researchers split in different direc-
tions, mostly ignoring each other, or else
engaging in bitter fights and controversies.
Over time however, largely because facts
have a way of not going away, a largely
shared vision both of fluctuations and of
methodology has emerged.”
Blanchard (2008) in ”The State of
Macro”. 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Early on in the introduction of a dissertation, it is common to provide the
reader with a statement about its main topic. After that a description
usually follows of the methodologies involved connected to the study of the
topic. If I were to make a statement about the main topic of this dissertation,
I would say it contains three essays all dealing with topics central to the
3
study of aggregate economic fluctuations in an open economy.
Although the dissertation is united by the topic described, I believe it
would be more helpful to the reader to actually know that the goal I set for
my dissertation was more about acquiring good knowledge of some of the
basic tools used in modern macroeconomics. In my opinion, a fruitful way
of accomplishing this would be to apply some of the different tools on topics
that are central within today’s modern research program for the study of
aggregate economic fluctuations in an open economy.
For the context described, one might be interested to know, compared
to earlier influential directions, what are the real benefits of using a modern
research program for the study of economic fluctuations. To be able to
see such benefits clearly seems to rely very much on a willingness to adopt
positivistic view on macroeconomics as a social science. In large, such a view
is held by many macroeconomists who constantly refer to macroeconomics
as a field that over time has progressed due to important improvements in its
theoretical foundation and econometric methodology. Such improvements
have been made possible largely due to the development over time of new
mathematical and numerical methodologies.1
In assessing the present situation, numerous influential researchers, as
affirmed in Blanchard (2008), Woodford (2008) and Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan (2008), have taken the view that macroeconomics as a field has
largely converged on the use of its methodology.2 Within the methodolog-
1For an early discussion of the use of mathematical and numerical methodologies in
macroeconomics, see Lucas (1980).
2The articles are all published in the first issue of American Economic Journal: Macroe-
conomics (2009), devoted especially to the topic convergence in macro.
4
ical framework, Woodford (2008) describes the current empirical research
program on economic fluctuations to be about “develop empirically vali-
dated quantitative models that can sensibly be used in counterfactual policy
analysis.” For the implementation of such a research program, a set of com-
plementary tools are involved. It is possible to distinguish the tools between
those used for structural modeling and those used for empirical validation.
For structural modeling, dynamic macroeconomic models (commonly re-
ferred to as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models) are
used. Given a structural model, empirical validation is done by using em-
pirical tools (based on a minimal set of prior restrictions about the economy)
to form facts which the structural model is expected to explain.
It is within such a research program, on issues mainly related to an open
economy, that I have found it compelling to base my research. Before I
give a summary of how the essays included here can be regarded to have
contributed to such a research program, it is perhaps wise to first take a
step back. More specifically, what I offer in the next section is an historical
outline on how the shared vision on economic fluctuations, macroeconomic
methodology and view on monetary policy, that is present in the current
research program, came about. After the outline, I emphasize, within the
program, three areas where major disagreement exists. The three areas form
a natural backdrop for the summary of the essays given in the final section,
since each essay seeks to make a specific contribution to a particular area of
disagreement.
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1.2 Convergence in vision and methodology
1.2.1 The Neo-Keynesian and Monetarist schools
In the 1960s and the early 1970s, macroeconomics as a field was divided
mainly between the Neo-Keynesian (NK) and the Monetarist schools. Both
schools, however, shared the view that interrupted changes in aggregate de-
mand for goods could have a substantial effect on output and employment.
The result was thought of as due to the presence of nominal rigidities which
prevented self-equilibrating mechanisms, at least in the short run, of the
economy to work. The disagreements were about the main causes for in-
terrupted changes in aggregate demand. The NKs claimed that to a great
extent such changes could be accounted for by disturbances in the form of
erratic changes in agents’ confidence, such as investors’ “animal spirit”. For
the Monetarists, the disturbances could mainly be contributed to irregu-
lar changes in the money supply. In a theoretical Hicksian IS-LM model
framework, the differences between the two schools could be illustrated by
differences in interest elasticity between the IS-curve and the LM-curve.
On theories related to the open economy aspect of an economy, the over-
shooting hypothesis presented in Dornbusch (1976) was quickly accepted by
many macroeconomists, and soon became a central building block in in-
ternational macroeconomics. The central assumption here was the view
that in the short run goods prices were sticky while financial variables,
such as the exchange rate, could react instantaneously to other variables.
This made it possible, within the theoretical framework provided by the the
Neo-Keynesian (NK) and the Monetarist schools, to show that the nominal
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exchange rate could follow an unexpected increase in the interest rate by
overshooting its long run equilibrium level.
In their attempts to use econometric tools in order to validate their the-
oretical ideas, the NK and the Monetarist schools opted for fundamentally
different approaches. The NKs based their methodology on a probability ap-
proach to econometrics. Within such an enterprize, the aim was to develop
large macro econometric models in order to provide an accurate descrip-
tion of the short run dynamics of the economic system. The models were
founded on an equation-by-equation estimation approach, based somewhat
loosely on economic theory, of the behavioral equations of the economy (e.g.
consumption function, money demand, Philips curve etc.). The Monetarists
in large found such an enterprize too ambitious, insisting that it was unlikely
that the short run dynamics of a complex economic system could be given
a reliable description within such a methodology. Instead, the Monetarists
took a freer econometric approach by their use of short run and long run
co-movements of aggregate time series in order to validate their narrative
theory. 3
The NK and the Monetarist schools used their positive theories together
with empirical validation by means of offering normative policy advice. For
the NKs this meant that they could regard their estimated econometric mod-
els as an acceptable place to start in order to evaluate the effect of monetary
policy. For the Monetarists, their view of the complexity of the dynamics
of the economic system combined with the strong long run empirical evi-
3Such form of empirical verification forms the basis of empirical evidence in Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960”.
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dence for the quantity theory of money (see Friedman (1987)) let them hold
on to Friedman (1960)’s main policy advice; namely that stabilization of
economic fluctuations in practice would best be served by adopting a fixed
percent growth rule for the money supply.
1.2.2 The New Classical school and Real Business Cycle
Theory
The introduction in the 1970s and the early 1980s of the New Classical (NC)
school and the real business cycle (RBC) theory led many macroeconomists
to change their views on how to analyze economic fluctuations. For both
directions, a microeconomic founded DSGE framework with a set of rigorous
assumptions about the structure of the economy was deployed. The two
most striking assumptions were the view of instantaneous market clearing,
and, on the part of the agents in economy, endogenous expectations in line
with the rational expectation hypothesis advocated in Muth (1961). The
set of rigorous assumptions for the NC school implied, as shown in Lucas
(1972), that only the unexpected part of the changes in money supply to
have short run effects on real variables. In the RBC theory, money and other
imperfections were left out of the model, making the equilibrating process
of the model economy simply an optimal response to stochastic technology
shocks.
The NC school spent little effort in trying to empirically validate their
models, pointing rather to its theoretical coherence as a sign of strength.
For the RBC theory, the calibration exercise within a DSGE framework was
put forward as a new empirical tool. Calibration itself made it possible
8
to use DSGE models to simulate the data generating process of the model
economy, and as such was able to make theoretical models the centerpiece
of empirical analysis. Kydland and Prescott (1996) argued that “matching
moments” between the simulated and actual data was the right way to go,
since theoretical business cycle models must be considered to be highly ab-
stract and consequently would be rejected in a classical probability approach
setting. In their pioneering work, Kydland and Prescott (1982) empirically
validated their RBC model by pointing to the high degree of fit between the
correlations from the simulated model and stylized facts of business cycles
quarterly data from the postwar U.S. economy. The empirical validation of
the RBC theory proved, however, in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) to
be much less successful for an open economy. In particular, strong discrep-
ancies were found for output which in the data were more highly correlated
across countries than consumption, while the business cycle model predicted
the opposite.
The modeling approach of the NC school and the RBC theory implicitly
implied critique, both in their approach to empirical validation and to their
normative policy advice, of the NK and the Monetarist schools. For empir-
ical validation, modeling rational expectations made it possible for Lucas
(1976) to show that the NK estimation of behavior equation and Monetarist
use of co-movements of aggregate time series in general would be incorrect
since the coefficients on these equations would be variant to policy change.
Apart from this, Sims (1980) provided his own critique of NK estimation
methodology, arguing that unreasonable restrictions on a behavior equation
could imply more unreasonable behavior implications for the system as a
9
whole. Due to this, reliable information from an economic system should be
obtained by simultaneous estimation by the use of a vector autoregressive
(VAR) model.
On the position on how to conduct monetary policy, the NC school
offered few clues since in their framework only the unexpected policy errors
and unforeseen changes in policy were able to influence real output. The
RBC theory argued that fluctuations in output to a great extent reflected
an economy’s optimal response that could be interpreted as a critique that
earlier schools were mixing cycles with trends.
After the introduction of the NC school and the RBC theory, macroe-
conomists from different traditions of economic thoughts engaged themselves
for a long period in bitter and stalled debates. A way to understand why
this situation became so tense, is to look at the different theories I have out-
lined in light of the two positivistic principles used in Blanchard (2008) as
determinants for the evolution of macroeconomics: (1) Facts have a way of
forcing irrelevant theory out. (2) Good theory also has a way of eventually
forcing bad theory out. At this point in time, the theories outlined could
arguably be weakened by one of the two principles. On the one hand, the
observed fact, which seems to have initiated the study of economic fluctua-
tions as a field, namely the substantial effect changes in aggregate demand
could have on output seemed much stronger than an economy based on the
assumption of competitive markets as the NC school and the RBC theory
would suggest. On the other hand, the NC school and the RBC theory of-
fered a much stronger theoretical framework than the Neo-Keynesian (NK)
10
and the Monetarist schools.
1.2.3 The New Neoclassical synthesis
In the last decade the development of a new class of DSGE models, referred
to on many occasions as New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) models, have
taken center stage in the study of economic fluctuations. The models seek
to merge important elements from the previously outlined directions of eco-
nomic thought. In the most basic version of an NNS model, the so-called
New Keynesian model, imperfect competition and nominal rigidities are in-
tegrated into a intertemporal general equilibrium framework with rational
expectations and technology shocks. The model offers many of the basic
features that macroeconomists today seem to share. Namely that economic
fluctuations can be caused by both changes in technology and monetary
policy and that agents’ expectations about the future could influence their
present behavior.
For the empirical validation of the NNS models, the type of VAR model
advocated in Sims (1980) has become the prime source of empirical evidence.
The validation consists of comparing impulse response functions of an iden-
tified VAR (Structural (SVAR)) model with that of the model economy.
Compared to the calibration approach advocated in Kydland and Prescott
(1996), the SVAR approach has the advantage that the information from the
impulse response functions will be based on the conditional correlations of
the structural shocks rather than the unconditional correlations when using
“matching moments”. In the literature such an approach has been quite
successful (see for instance Gali (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
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Evans (1999a)) in providing empirical support for NNS models; particulary
for the closed economy version of the New Keynesian model.
In principle, the use of NNS models makes it easy for researchers to de-
liver policy advice. The reason is that the model’s microeconomic foundation
implies that optimal policy can be derived directly from the preferences from
the private agents in the economy. Such a utility based approach has been
extensively used in the analysis of monetary policy. As shown in Woodford
(2003a), a general result is that the stabilization of goals which the agents
find desirable can best be achieved if the central bank commit itself to a
monetary policy rule. The gains from a commitment to a policy rule lies in
the fact, as first stressed in Kydland and Prescott (1977), that it can be used
to successfully steer the private sector’s expectations. In the New Keynesian
model (both in in its closed and under particular parameter values the small
open economy version) the optimal monetary policy rule takes on a partic-
ularly simple form, since an interest rate rule with only domestic inflation
targeting is shown to be able to close the welfare relevant output gap of the
model (see e.g. Blanchard and Gali (2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2005)).
The rule-based monetary policy advice from the NNS models is in sharp
contrast with NC school and the RBC-theory lack of advice. Viewed in
comparison to the NK and the Monetarist schools, the NNS is different
from the discretionary policy advice from the NK school while reminiscent
of the monetarist’s advice of a rule based fixed percentage growth rate in
the money supply. However, for the NNS models, the rule can be explicitly
derived from the model itself. Maybe as a result of this, the models have
been a force in influencing central banks around the world, where in the last
12
decade it has become common to adopt some type of an inflation-targeting
regime.
1.3 Some of today’s disagreements about vision
and implementation of methodology
Although many macroeconomists today have accepted the NNS framework
as a proper place to conduct further research; there are within the research
program considerable disagreements related to specific features about its vi-
sion on fluctuations and on the appropriate use of its methodology. Since
it is of specific interest for the essays included here, three areas of disagree-
ments are now highlighted. Namely, what types of imperfections should be
included in a standard NNS model, how should its open economy features
be specified and caveats related to the use of SVAR as a tool to discriminate
among competing models.
1.3.1 What types of imperfections to include?
On the issue of what types of imperfections to include, disagreements among
macroeconomists can be related to the following question: Beyond the use
of nominal rigidities and imperfect competition, what other types of imper-
fections matters in macro so that they deserve to be included in an standard
NNS model?
In practice, the most noticeable differences on the approach to the issue
seems today to be found between macroeconomists involved in practical pol-
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icymaking at central banks and those working in academic institutions.4 For
macroeconomists at central banks, state-of-the-art DSGE models (based on
a Bayesian estimation) with numerous imperfections (e.g. habit formation,
backward indexation of prices and convex costs of changing investments)
and many loosely defined structural shocks (e.g. shock to wage markups,
price markups, exogenous spending and risk premium) are typically em-
ployed.5 As shown for instance in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005b), the inclusion of many imperfections
and structural shocks is able to make such DSGE models fit the data very
well.
It is important, though, to be aware of that data fitting itself by no
means provides independent support for making a model useful for policy
analysis. Provided that some of the imperfections and structural shocks
included in the model are based on parameters with weak or no empirical
support (i.e. free parameters), they will be open to the same criticism as put
forward in Lucas (1976). As emphasized in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2008), the parameters and shocks of a DSGE model can only be regarded
to be structural if they are invariant to policy change.
In essay 3 of the dissertation it is demonstrated that such type of criticism
is relevant for the case of the exchange rate risk premium. Many open
4The source of the disagreements may not be so much due to fundamental differences in
theoretical views, but rather something that has sprung out as a response to accommodate
different needs: Works intended for the academic community typically requires a sound
theoretical base. Consequently, the type of imperfections used need strong backing from
microeconomic facts. For works used in the analysis of applied problems, the requirements
are more about achieving results judged to be reasonable among policymakers.
5For instance the model used in Smets and Wouters (2007) contains 19 structural
parameters and 17 parameters corresponding to the variances and the first order autocor-
relation coefficients of the underlying shock processes.
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economy DSGE models have today obtained empirically plausible results
for the low degree of risk sharing among countries by modeling the risk
premium as an exogenous stochastic process. However, when making the
risk premium endogenous in a DSGE model, it is demonstrated here that
such a variable is not invariant to monetary policy changes, and actually
has a positive impact in enhancing the utility for the representative agent
of a small open economy.
1.3.2 Open economy features of the New Keynesian model
The New Keynesian model offers many of the basic features that macroe-
conomists today seem to share regarding the closed economy. The theories
are further strengthened by the empirical evidence that can be obtained
from the use of a SVAR. For the open economy, though, such agreement is
harder to come about. Specifically, the difficulties are related to the issue
about the exchange rate response of monetary policy and on how should
monetary policy operate in an open economy.
For the first issue, many SVAR studies have difficulties in finding em-
pirical support for the traditional Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothesis (see
for e.g. Uhlig and Scholl (2005) and Faust and Rogers (2003)).6 The lack of
empirical support seems, as pointed out in Bjørnland (2006), to have been
transmitted into uncertainty on how the exchange rate response to mone-
tary policy should be specified, with researchers suggesting that theoretical
models should be specified with delayed overshooting impact similar to what
6For SVAR studies exceptions are to be found in Bjørnland (2006, 2008) while
Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006) find such support for event stud-
ies.
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is observed in many SVAR studies.
On the second issue on how monetary policy should operate in an open
economy, many macroeconomists seem to share the view for the need also
here of a monetary policy rule with an explicit inflation target. Though,
there is little consensus about whether the exchange rate should also be
included in such a rule and, if yes, how much of a interest rate response.7
Even if the exchange rate is not included, it is shown in Taylor (2001) that
the exchange rate in a monetary policy rule could lend itself to a strong in-
direct effect on the interest rate. Such indirect effect can be the consequence
of a monetary policy rule based on forecasts on future variables or with a
rational expectation model for the term term structure of the interest rate.
In both cases, inertia in the monetary transmission mechanism (i.e. unex-
pected exchange rate movements work with a lag on inflation and output)
will make the interest rate respond to exchange rate movements through the
effect this variable has on the expectations of future output and inflation.
In essay 2 of the dissertation, the two issues discusses above are analyzed
by the use of a SVAR for six open economies. By identifying the SVAR so
that contemporaneous interdependence between monetary policy and the
exchange rate is allowed for, the papers provides empirical support for the
conventional overshooting hypothesis in all countries. Furthermore, the ex-
change rate seems to had a strong impact for monetary policy makers when
setting interest rate.
7For some different views on this issue, see for instance Ball (1999), Svensson (2000),
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) and Paoli (2007).
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1.3.3 The ability of a SVAR model to provide empirical ev-
idence
Though SVAR today has become the primary tool for discriminating among
competing DSGE models, the ability of a SVAR model to provide such ev-
idence has recently been questioned in a number of papers. The disagree-
ments are primarily linked to the issue of whether an estimated VAR is
able to reflect the reduced form dynamics of an economic system and the
usefulness of the various identification schemes used in identifying a VAR.
On its ability to reflect the reduced form dynamics, Fernandez-Villaverde,
Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2005) show that a DSGE model will lend itself
to a VAR representation only under specific conditions. In addition, even if
this is satisfied, the VAR representation of a DSGE model may require an
infinite number of lags which necessarily must be truncated by an estimated
VAR based on a limited number of data.8 According to Ravenna (2006),
truncation can cause large errors due to estimation bias which can be fur-
ther increased by the imposition of an identification scheme, even though
the latter is based on correct identifying restrictions.
Regarding the identification schemes themselves, they are usually based
on restrictions in the form of (contemporaneous) short run, long run (neu-
trality) or sign restrictions of the dynamic impact the structural shocks have
on the model’s variables. On the use of short run restrictions, many macroe-
conomists have argued that they are problematic since economic theory in
general will have difficulties in justifying enough restrictions. According
8This case will arise when the true system follows a finite order VAR of n variables
which is estimated by a VAR with m < n variables.
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to Faust and Leeper (1997) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), a
scheme based on long run neutrality restrictions will not hold exact since
a VAR model will only be able to perform an approximate estimation of
the economic system. For sign restrictions the problem is, as shown in Fry
and Pagan (2005) and Paustian (2007a), linked to the fact that the weak-
ness of information contained in such restrictions will make identification
non-unique and as consequently inaccurate if not enough restrictions are
enforced.
In essay 1 of the dissertation the problems with the various identifica-
tion schemes are discussed and sought to be improved on. Specifically, the
paper develops an identification scheme that combines the use of short run
and sign restriction and argues for why it has the ability to mitigate the
main problems associated with the identification scheme frequently used to
identify a VAR.
1.3.4 Benefits of further progress
In light of the disagreements present in the NNS framework, a positivistic
view can be taken relying on that further research will continue to gener-
ate improvements in both methodology and theoretical foundation with the
positive implication of bridging the gap various areas of disagreements. In
general, this could easily be transferred into better policies since the micro-
founded approach of the NNS models implies that less disagreements about
its specification will automatically be transferred into less uncertainty when
it comes to policy analysis.
For monetary policy, such a process could be of great importance for the
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practical implementation of a rule based monetary policy. This is due to
that the full gain from commitment to a policy rule, as shown in Woodford
(2003a), only will come about if the central bank is clear about its policy
and the limits of its knowledge. With improved and more certain knowledge,
a monetary policy could become more robust since optimal policy response
can be articulated for more contingencies that an economy might face In
the future, there is perhaps hope that this could make practical monetary
policy more of a science and less of an art.9
1.4 Summmary
1.4.1 Essay 1: Combining short term and sign restrictions
to identify a VAR. A useful approach
The purpose of the essay is to suggest the use of an identification scheme
that will make it easier for a researcher to achieve reliable identification of
a VAR model.
Usually, the identification of a VAR model is achieved by imposing a set
of prior restrictions on an identification scheme. The set of prior restrictions
is justified based on prior information reflecting the researcher’s strong belief
about the working of the economy, and often takes the form of either (con-
temporaneous) short run, long run (neutrality) or sign restrictions. However,
such schemes have often been criticized either on the grounds that they are
unreasonable or not numerous enough to achieve proper identification
In this paper, an identification scheme that combines the use of short run
9See Blanchard (2006) for an discussion of this issue.
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and sign restrictions is developed, and it is argued for why such a scheme has
the ability to mitigate the main problems associated with the identification
scheme frequently used to identify a VAR.
1.4.2 Essay 2: How does monetary policy respond to ex-
change rate movements? New international evidence
With Hilde C. Bjørnland
The purpose of the essay is to analyze the interaction between monetary
policy and the exchange rate for six open economies (Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the UK), focusing in particular on how
monetary policy has responded to exchange rate movements.
The analysis is carried out using a structural vector autoregressive (VAR)
model that is identified using a combination of sign and short-run (zero) re-
strictions. Such restrictions have the ability to preserve the endogenous
interaction between the interest rate and the exchange rate commonly ob-
served in the market.
In all countries, the results suggest that the interest rate increases sys-
tematically in response to a shock that depreciates the exchange rate. Fur-
thermore, we find the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates
to be non-trivial. In particular, following a contractionary monetary policy
shock, the exchange rate appreciates on impact. The exchange rate then
gradually depreciates back to baseline, broadly consistent with UIP. These
results are in contrast to the results that have been found previously in the
literature using recursive restrictions, or, pure sign restrictions, to identify
the structural VARs.
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1.4.3 Essay 3: Monetary Policy, Risk Premium and Portfolio
Holdings in a Small Open Economy
With Michal Zdenek
The purpose of the essay is to make the risk premium and portfolio holdings
endogenous in a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model for an
small open economy (SOE) and investigate the impact of monetary policy.
Two results stand out from our analysis: First, the risk premium serves
as an allocative efficiency role since it provides clearing for the markets for
nominal bonds which is used by the agents in order to provide hedging
against consumption risk. Second, monetary policy improves a SOE’s port-
folio selection opportunities by adopting a policy of strict domestic inflation
targeting.
Our main results are of interest since they contradict the commonly
used policy argument that nominal exchange rate uncertainty and the risk
premium have a negative impact on a country’s welfare. Furthermore, the
results question the validity of the approach of modeling the risk premium
as an exogenous stochastic process as is commonly done in New Keynesian
or NNS DSGE models.
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Part II
Essays
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2
Essay 1: Combining Short Term and Sign
Restrictions to Identify a VAR. A Useful
Approach
25
Abstract
Structural VAR models are an important tool in the analysis of economic
fluctuations. Once identified, the VAR model can provide information of
the dynamic quantitative impact that structural shocks have on economic
variables. However, the identification schemes used to identify a VAR have
recently been criticized either on the grounds that they are unreasonable,
or not numerous enough to achieve proper identification. In this paper, I
develop an identification scheme that combines the use of short run and
sign restrictions and argue for why such a scheme may make it easier for a
researcher to achieve identification. 1
1I am grateful to Hilde C. Bjørnland, Gernot Doppelhofer, Dag Henning Jacobsen and
conference participants at Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance (CEF) in
Paris (2008) for constructive comments.
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2.1 Introduction
Much of the analysis of economic fluctuations today focuses on the devel-
opment of empirically validated dynamic quantitative general equilibrium
models. Within such a research program, a goal is to build structural dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that are able to match
moments in data. The moments may be correlation, standard deviation or
impulse response functions. In such a context, information from the estima-
tion of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model (where all variables are treated
as endogenous) is considered useful since the estimated VAR model has the
ability to reflect the complex equilibrium dynamics observed in a structural
model.
A necessary requirement for the empirical validation is that the impulse
response functions are derived from an identified VAR model. For this to
be the case the VAR model must be converted from its reduced form rep-
resentation to its structural VAR (SVAR) representation; thereby making
impulse response functions measure the impact of the structural shocks of
the economy. The information from the impulse response functions of the
structural shocks is useful since it can be used as a selection criteria to choose
among competing DSGE models, or for the estimation of a particular DSGE
model’s structural parameters.2
Usually, the identification of a VAR model is achieved by imposing a set
of prior restrictions on an identification scheme. The set of prior restrictions
2Well known examples of verifying competing traditions of economic macroeconomic
thought, which have stirred a lot of debate, are the inquiry in Gali (1999) of the response
to hours from a technology shock and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005b) of the
response to real variables from a monetary policy shock.
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is justified based on prior information reflecting the researcher’s strong be-
lief about the working of the economy, and often takes the form of either
(contemporaneous) short run, long run (neutrality) or sign restrictions.
However, although useful, each of these schemes is also problematic in its
own right. The use of only short run restrictions may be problematic since
economic theory in general could have a hard time justifying enough restric-
tions. A scheme based on long run neutrality restrictions will, according to
Faust and Leeper (1997) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), not hold
exact since a VAR will only be able to perform an approximate estimation of
the economic system. The latest identification scheme, based on the use of
sign restrictions, has been criticized by Fry and Pagan (2005) and Paustian
(2007a) on the grounds that the weakness of information contained in such
restrictions will make identification non-unique and consequently inaccurate
if not enough restrictions are enforced.
For this paper, I suggest an identification scheme that for many applica-
tions may make it easier for a researcher to achieve reliable identification of
a VAR model. In particular, I develop an identification scheme that com-
bines the use of short run and sign restrictions and argue that such a scheme
will mitigate the main problems associated with the identification schemes
frequently used to identify a VAR. The arguments are related to that such
identification schemes will have the ability to incorporate all the types of
prior information used in the earlier schemes. Such a property could be
useful since it might be the case that a researcher has prior information of
many types considered to be reliable. If this is the case, it will address the
main problems associated with earlier schemes. The reason is linked to the
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fact that with other types of reliable prior information enforced, fewer short
run restrictions and less numerous sign restrictions will be needed in order
to achieve proper identification.
The three applications in the paper serve the purpose of illustrating the
usefulness of the identification scheme. In the first application, I look at how
a monetary policy shock and an exchange rate shock can be identified in a
small open economy model. The prior view held is that both shocks have
delayed effect on real variables, but immediate effect on the interest rate
and the exchange rate. In the second application, a bank lending shock is
identified. The prior view here is that this shock will have a positive imme-
diate impact on real variables but not on inflation. For the final application
I identify technology shock in Gali (1999). The prior view held is that the
effect of technology shock on the level of productivity in the long run will
be strong but inaccurately estimated.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2, the main problems
associated to the identification schemes commonly used to identify a VAR
are reviewed. Section 2.3 develops and argues under which conditions an
identification scheme that combines the use of short run and sign restrictions
could be beneficial. Section 2.4 illustrates the use of such an identification
based on two illustrative examples. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Common approaches to the identification of a
VAR
The earliest approach to identify a VAR, as used in Sims (1980), imposed
on the identification scheme short run prior restrictions in a recursive form.
The restrictions can be thought of as reflecting the contemporaneous rela-
tionship between the structural shocks and the variables in the VAR model.
Later, it became popular to replace short run restrictions with long run neu-
trality restrictions. More recently, an identification approach known as sign
restrictions, which is based on restricting the shape of the impulse response
functions on the structural shocks, is widely being used.
In conjunction to the identification schemes mentioned, a great deal of
criticisms have been raised over the years; each for its own particular reason.
A major point in this paper is to argue that the criticisms for many appli-
cations can be mitigated if the researcher uses an identification scheme that
combines the use of short run and sign restrictions. Before carrying out such
an argument, I find it appropriate to start with setting up a general VAR
and to review the main problems associated with the identification schemes
commonly adopted in the literature.
2.2.1 The general VAR set up
The VAR model in matrix form (for simplicity ignoring any deterministic
terms) can be expressed as
A(L)Xt = et, with Σe = E(ete
′
t), (2.1)
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where A(L) is a (mxm) matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, A(L) =∑p
i=0AiL
i with A0 = Im. Xt is a (mx1) vector of endogenous variables.
et is the one step ahead prediction error which is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero and a positive semidefinite covariance matrix
Σe.
Given that A(L) is invertible, the VAR model can be written in terms
of its moving average (MA) representation:
Xt = B(L)et, with B(L) = A(L)
−1 (2.2)
In the literature, the standard assumption is that the model contains m
structural shocks εt which are uncorrelated to each other and related linearly
to et.
3 If we normalize the structural shocks to have unit variance, we can
write this relationship as
et = Cεt, with Im = E(εtε
′
t). (2.3)
The MA representation of the model can now be written in terms of its
structural shocks as
Xt = D(L)εt, (2.4)
where D(L) = B(L)C. This representation is the one we need in order
to study the dynamic impact of structural shocks on the model’s variables
(e.g. in the form of impulse responses or variance decomposition). B(L) can
by found by the ordinary least square estimation of A(L). However, for C
3The violation of this assumption, as shown in Cooly and Dwyer (1998), implies spec-
ification error that can can lead to very poor estimate of the impulse response functions.
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the only restrictions used so far come from equation (2.1) and (2.3) which
implies that
Σe = E(ete
′
t) = AE(εtε
′
t)C
′ = CC ′. (2.5)
Since there are many different decompositions satisfying CC ′ =
∑
e, we
do not have an unique MA representation in terms of the structural shocks.
However, for two different decompositions, Σe = CC
′ and Σe = C˜C˜ ′, it must
be the case that C = C˜Q with Q being an orthogonal matrix, i.e. QQ′ = Im.
A property of this type of a matrix is that the columns Q = [q1, ..., qm] are
orthonormal which tells us that its vectors are mutually perpendicular, i.e.
< qi, qj >= 0 for i 6= j, and of unit length, i.e. ||qi||=1. The setting
represents the vantage point from which the standard identification schemes
in the literature have developed.
2.2.2 Identification using short run restrictions
The identification scheme most commonly adopted is the one put forward in
Sims (1980). In this scheme the prior restrictions are of a contemporaneous
nature, restricting the short run interdependence among the variables in
the system.4 Such restrictions usually seek their justifications from informal
reasoning. For instance, it is often claimed that monetary policy variables
(as in Gali (1992)) will react contemporaneously to news in real variables,
while it may take some time for monetary policy news to impact the real
variables in the economy. The latter is due to the belief that unexpected
changes in monetary policy must first work its way through the financial
4What is meant by short run will in practical applications be determined by the fre-
quency of the data used in the estimation of the VAR model.
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sector of the economy before being able to have any substantial impact on
the real part of the economy.
To implement the identification scheme, the variables in Xt can be cast
in a recursive contemporaneous order of determination. Technically, it im-
plies selecting C˜ = Cc (i.e. the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky
decomposition) and Q = Im. The identification scheme will now restrict the
structural shocks in such a way so that the structural shock associated with
the first variable is able to have an immediate impact on all the variables
in the system, while the structural shock associated with the nth variable
is only able to have a contemporaneous effect on the last n to m variables
in the system. In total, in order to identify all the structural shocks of the
model, the researcher must select m(m − 1)/2 short run prior restrictions
corresponding to the zero elements in the non-triangular part of Cc. For
many cases, the need to identify all the structural shocks of the system may
not be necessary . If this is the case, one can get away with the use of fewer
zero restrictions since the identification of the n-th shock of the system will
be invariant to the restrictions enforced on the first 1 to (n-1) variables in the
system (see proposition 4.1 in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999b)).
An advantage of the identification scheme is that it has the ability to
uniquely identify the structural shocks. However, it seems that for many
applications it has been difficult to come up with sufficient reasonable justi-
fications to uniquely identify the structural shocks. Cooley and Leroy (1985)
demonstrate this point, arguing that contemporaneous prior information is
hardly obtainable from general equilibrium models. Imposing wrong prior
restrictions has the consequence that the SVAR model becomes misspeci-
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fied. Canova and Pina (2003) show that wrong short run prior restrictions
are able to substantially bias the results of the economy it seeks to identify.
2.2.3 Identification using long run restrictions
Another identification scheme commonly used is the one first put forward
in Blanchard and Quah (1989). For this scheme, the prior information take
the form of long run neutrality restrictions; restricting the long run impact
the structural shocks have on the variables in the system. In comparison
with short run restriction, such neutrality restrictions will for many cases
be stronger grounded. This is because competing theoretical models in
business cycle literature often share the same long run features. For instance,
Blanchard and Quah (1989) identify demand shock on the grounds that it
has no long run effect on the level of production. In Gali (1999), technology
shock is identified on the grounds that it is the only shock that can have a
permanent effect on the level of measured labor productivity.
In a similar vein to using short run restrictions, the recursive ordering
of the variables will determine which structural shocks that will have a long
run neutrality impact on the variables in the system. Consequently, when
applying this identification scheme m(m−1)/2 zero restrictions in a triangu-
lar form must also be enforced in order to identify all the structural shocks
in the system.5 In this case, however, the restrictions must be enforced on
the long run multipliers of B(1)C.
Even if the neutrality restrictions are well grounded, Faust and Leeper
5Also for this identification scheme, the identification of the n-th structural shocks will
be invariant to the ordering of the earlier variables. As such, fewer long run restrictions
need to be enforced if not all structural shocks are in need of identification.
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(1997) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) show that such an iden-
tification scheme could be problematic. The problem is linked to the fact
that the long-run effect of structural shocks in general will be imprecisely
estimated in finite samples. The imprecision occurs when the VAR model
estimated is truncated so that the number of lags it has is lower than the
true data generating process. Even though the estimated VAR model has
the same number of lags as the true data generating process, the finite sam-
ple property of the time series data will, as Faust and Leeper (1997) argue,
imply imprecise results since the estimation of B(1) will not be exact. The
problem will be especially severe if the sample size is small relative to the lag
order of the true VAR model. Imprecise estimation of B(1) is problematic
since, by the imposition of the long run restrictions, the imprecision will be
transferred into the estimate of the other parameters in the model making
the estimation of the dynamic impact of structural shocks biased.
Though it would have no impact on solving the problem just raised,
Gali (1992) shows that it is also possible to use an identification scheme
that combines short run and long run restrictions. Technically, in order
to identify all the structural shocks of the system it amounts to imposing
together m(m − 1)/2 prior restrictions on B(1)C = 1 and C. Potentially,
given that the problems with using long run restrictions were not present,
such a scheme could be beneficial since it makes prior information in the
form of both short run and long run restrictions available.
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2.2.4 Identification using sign restrictions
A more recent methodological innovation for identifying structural shocks
in a VAR is the imposition of sign restrictions. The method was first put
forward in Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Uhlig (2005) and Faust (1998), an-
alyzing different questions. However, although the set up was different, they
all amount to the same basic idea, namely, seek identification by restricting
the shape of the impulse response functions.
Numerical methods are used to implement the method. The basic idea
is to make candidate draws for C in order to compute the corresponding
impulse response functions. Based on the draws from the computed im-
pulse response functions, the impulse responses that satisfy the prior sign
restriction are kept while the others are discarded. Technically, candidate
draws for C can be collected by setting C˜ = Cc and to make draws based
on a numerical process so that the orthogonal space for Q is searched in a
systematic way.
A clear advantage of this approach, compared to the other identification
approaches, is that such restrictions are robust since they contain very little
information. Due to this, restrictions are readily available from economic
theory, especially in the form of DSGE models. But using sign restrictions
also implies one will not be able to uniquely identify the structural shocks.
As Fry and Pagan (2005) and Paustian (2007b) pointed out, there could be
many totally different structural shocks satisfying the sign restrictions. Due
to this, meaning the results from the numerical process could imply highly
inaccurate results for the impulse response functions.
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A way of reducing this problem, as shown in Paustian (2007b), would
be to go on to increase the number of sign restrictions. However, it is not
clear whether achieving identification based on such type of prior informa-
tion would be any more reliable than using the type of prior information
associated with the restrictions used in the earlier identification schemes.
In addition, enforcing a lot of sign restrictions could make the numerical
procedure used for the identification extremely time consuming.
2.3 Identification combining the use of short run
and sign restrictions
Compared to the identification approaches reviewed, an alternative choice
would be to use an identification scheme that combines short run and sign
restrictions. In this section, I argue for the applicability of such an identifi-
cation scheme and show how it can be developed.
When confronted with the situation of identifying structural shocks in a
VAR, a researcher could well be faced with prior information considered to
be reliable in the form short term, long run and sign restrictions; though,
neither numerous enough nor accurate enough to achieve reliable identifica-
tion using some of the earlier identification schemes.
If it is the case that a researcher has at his disposal prior information
considered to be reliable of different types, selecting among one of the earlier
identification schemes would necessarily imply that not all prior information
can be taken into account. For an identification scheme that combines the
use of short run and sign restrictions, however, it will be possible to take
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into account prior information of all the different types. The incorporation
of short run and sign restrictions can be done mainly as before. That is,
place short run restrictions on the C matrix while for sign restrictions re-
strict the impulse response functions generated from different orthogonal
draws. But for this scheme the draws must be made conditional on that
the zero restrictions on the C matrix are satisfied. For long term neutrality
restrictions, I suggest that the prior information should be be incorporated
by forming sign restrictions in the shape of interval restrictions around zero
on the impulse response functions at a distant horizon.
In total, such a set up will help to address the main problems associated
with the identification schemes reviewed: Since one do not need to pick a full
set of short run restrictions, the researcher has the opportunity of selecting
only the most reliable ones. Implementing long run neutrality restrictions,
by forming interval restriction around zero at a distant horizon, would better
serve the fact that estimated VAR is only an approximate estimate of the
economic system.6 Concerning the use of pure sign restrictions, with the
enforcement of the other types of prior information, one will have fewer
opportunities for differences in structural shocks dynamics. Due to this,
fewer sign restrictions are needed in order to avoid the problem of highly
inaccurate results for the impulse response functions.
6It will of course here be a question how wide such an interval should be. I do not
take a strong stand on the issue, but point to the fact that such an approach would be
more robust than enforcing long run restrictions that must hold exactly. A way to analyze
this issue would be to conduct simulated exercises. As shown in (preliminary) Vigfusson
(2007), the power of identifying a VAR using long run restrictions is quite strong, which
suggests that a relative small interval could be used to achieve proper identification.
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2.3.1 Restricting the Gram-Schmidt process
The identification scheme proposed calls for a combination of the scheme
used for short run restrictions with the one used for sign restrictions. A
challenge that now needs to be addressed is to provide a general algorithm
that can be used to implement such a scheme.
The general idea behind such an algorithm must be a numerical process
(as when using sign restrictions) where draws are made such that the space
of possible structural orthogonal shocks is searched in a systematic way.
But now the numerical process must be restricted, so that it only searches
systematically in the space of possible orthogonal shocks where the enforced
short run zero restrictions are satisfied. Such a numerical process will pro-
duce restricted draws for Qr, which can be used to calculate Cr and its
corresponding impulse response functions which will be kept if they satisfy
the enforced sign restrictions.
In the sign restriction approach used in Uhlig (2005), candidates for
the impulse response functions of a specific structural shock are made by
constructing an impulse vector in C based on normalized i.i.d. draws from
the unit sphere from a vector in Q. If more than one type of structural
shock needs to be identified, several normalized i.i.d. draws from different
unit spheres in Q must be made. Since the matrix Q is assumed to be
orthonormal, the unit spheres must be made orthogonal to each other. An
algorithm that can be used to achieve this is the Gram-Schmidt process.7
For the identification scheme I suggest here there is a demand to provide
7Other algorithms exist, but the recursive property of the Gram-Schmidt process is
useful for the purpose here, which is to restrict the space of orthogonal draws.
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restricted orthonormal draws for Qr, in order to calculate Cr. 8 I propose
doing this using a Gram-Schmidt process linearly restricted so that the short
run restrictions placed on Cr are satisfied. In general, one can accomplish
this by adopting the following algorithm.
Algorithm: The restricted Gram-Schmidt process
1. Fix the matrix C˜, for instance by selecting C˜ = CC (i.e. lower trian-
gular matrix of the Cholesky).
2. For m − 1 of the impulse vectors of C enforce on the non-diagonal
elements of the matrix between < 0, m(m−1)2 − 1 > contemporaneous
zero restrictions. The restricted impulse vectors Cr = [cr1, c
r
2, ..., c
r
m]
should be ordered in increasing order with regard to the number of
zero restrictions in each impulse vector.9
3. Restrict the vector vri = [v
r
1i, v
r
2i, ..., v
r
mi]
′ so that it contains an un-
known if it corresponds to a zero component in crm+1−i otherwise set
it equal to a normalized i.i.d. draw.
4. Making the vector orthogonal by recursively solving the restricted
Gram-Schmidt process. The process does this by solving the following
8A thank to Gernot Doppelhoffer for pointing this out to me.
9The matrix Cr does only need to include as many vectors as the number of shocks
desired to be identified. Though, they must be ordered from right to left the way specified
here.
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linear system of equations for its unknowns in uri = [u
r
1i, u
r
2i, ..., u
r
mi]
′
and vri :
uri = v
r
i−
i−1∑
j=1
projurjv
r
i where the projection operator projurjv
r
i :=
< urj ,v
r
i >
< urj ,u
r
j >
urj
Linearly restricted such that10
0 = cc11u
r
1i if c
r
1,m+1−i = 0
0 = cc21u
r
1i + c
c
22u
r
2i if c
r
2,m+1−i = 0
...
0 = ccm,1u
r
1i + c
c
m2u
r
2i + ...+ c
c
mmu
r
mi if c
r
m,m+1−i = 0
i = 1, 2, ...,m
5. Make the vector of restricted draws uri orthonormal by enforcing them
to be of unit length:
qri =
uri
||uri ||
i = 1, 2, ...,m.
6. Repeat steps 3-5 until n2 restricted draws have been made.
For a given covariance matrix, the algorithm provides us with n2 restricted
draws for Qr = [qrm,q
r
m−1, ...,qr1]. This can be used to calculate Cr = AcQr,
10Initially we restrict by setting non-diagonal elements of [cr1, c
r
2, ..., c
r
m] =
Cc[qr1,q
r
2, ...,q
r
m] equal to zero. Since we can use the condition that q
r
i =
uri
||uri ||
, it is
possible to arrive at the restricting equations given here.
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now restricted so that short run zero restrictions are enforced.
In practical applications, the identification scheme would form a part
of the estimation and inference procedure. It seems convenient to do this
by integrating the scheme proposed into the Bayesian methodology used
in Uhlig (2005). The numerical procedure would then start by making n1
draws of the reduced form coefficients from the posterior of the estimated
VAR. For each of these draws (based on the calculation of its covariance
matrix) make n2 draws based on the identification scheme suggested here.
Calculate the impulse response functions and keep the draws satisfying the
sign restrictions. The draws would then form the simulated data which can
be used to calculate the percentiles of the impulse response functions.
2.4 Applications
In this section I present three applications. The applications are meant be
illustrative of the usefulness of the identification scheme.
2.4.1 Application 1: Combining short run and sign restric-
tions
For this application, the variables included in the VAR are thought of as
being representative of a small open economy. The variables are Xt =
[i∗t , yt, pit, it, ret]′ where i∗t and it is the foreign and domestic interest rate,
while the other variables (denoted in log or log differences) are gross domestic
product (gdp) yt, inflation rate pit and the real exchange rate ret. Connected
to the last two variables in the vector Xt are two structural shocks in the
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form of monetary policy shock and exchange rate shock. The data used for
estimating the VAR model is from Norway in the period 1983Q1 to 2004Q4.
A detailed analysis of the results for Norway and a host of other economies
are provided in Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2008).
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Figure 2.1: Estimated impulse responses with 16 and 84 percent error bands
for monetary policy shock and exchange rate shock.
In the VAR model, monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks are
identified using a combination of short run and sign restrictions.11 For the
short run restrictions, we have enforced that both monetary policy shocks
and exchange rate shocks have no short run impact (i.e. quarterly) on the
11In Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2008) the identification scheme is named a Cholesky-Sign
decomposition. By setting in for the zero and sign restrictions in the algorithm presented
here, one can confirm that such a scheme is a just a special case of the identification
scheme presented here.
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three first variables of the system. The zero restrictions on the first variable
is based on the assumption that domestic variables in a small open economy
do not influence foreign variables. For the next two variables, we take the
commonly held view that monetary policy shock works with a lag on output
and inflation due to the presence of some “outside-lag”. Further, we find
the zero restriction put on exchange rate shocks on inflation reasonable due
to the presence of exchange rate pass-through. Concerning the use of sign
restrictions, we have adopted only one restriction, namely the traditional
Dornbusch overshooting hypothesis that a positive monetary policy shock
must be met by an immediate appreciation of the real exchange rate.
The results of the impulse response functions for a monetary policy shock
and an exchange rate shock are displayed in figure 2.1. With regard to a
monetary policy shock, both GDP and inflation (with some price puzzle)
have a mirrored hump shaped response. Such a response is commonly ob-
served in the VAR literature. The shape of the response to the exchange
rate is in line with the traditional Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothesis. For
an exchange rate shock, the strong but short lived response to domestic
interest rate is noteworthy, in addition to the puzzling response to inflation.
In general, as documented extensively in Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2008),
the identification scheme adopted here will, compared to a Cholesky identifi-
cation scheme, deliver an exchange rate response in line with the traditional
Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothesis (i.e. no “exchange rate puzzle”) and
be able to account for a much stronger interaction between the monetary
policy and the exchange rate.
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2.4.2 Application 2: Combining short run and sign restric-
tions
For the second application, I let the variables in the VAR also to be represen-
tative of a small open economy, but now explicitly taking into account the
financial sector. The variables are Xt = [pit, ygap,t, pht, ret, it,mixt]
′ where
ygap,t and pht (in logs) represent the output gap and the property price,
respectively. The variable mixt represents the total bank credit divided by
total credit in the economy. The other variables are defined as in the first
application.12 The data used for estimating the VAR model is from Norway
in the period 1988Q2 to 2008Q2.
For the VAR model, I am interested to identify how bank lending shocks
transmit themselves through to the economy. 13 The inclusion of a mix
variable in the VAR model can be considered to make the model particu-
larly able to identify such type of shocks since changes in the variable can
be thought as reflecting changes in the supply of credit to the economy and
not demand (see for e.g. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) for a discussion
about this issue). Still, the issue about identification must be resolved. Dif-
ferent from the assumption made in the first application for the identification
of monetary policy shocks, bank lending shocks are, since they provide direct
access to liquidity for the economy, likely to have a much faster impact on
many of the variables in the system. This should call for an identification
approach using fewer zero restrictions and more sign restrictions. Hence,
12To limit the size of the VAR, the foreign interest rate is for this application included
as an exogenous variable.
13According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988), a bank lending channel could form a
central part of the financial sector in an economy.
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Figure 2.2: Estimated impulse responses with 16 and 84 percent error bands
for bank lending shock with one basis point impact on the mix.
I do this by letting a positive bank lending shock to be restricted to have
an immediate positive impact on the output gap and the property price.
Further, I restrict the short term interest rate to increase and the exchange
rate to appreciate. For the interest rate, the restriction is based on the view
that increased supply of bank credit must be financed by increased demand
for money from the money market which should increase the short term
interest rate. Such an increase in the interest rate should also, in line with
the traditional overshooting theory, to call for an immediate appreciation of
the exchange rate. Finally, I place a zero restriction on inflation, justified
by sluggishness of the firms in their price setting behavior.
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The results for the impulse response functions for a bank lending shocks
of one basis point on the mix are displayed in figure 2.2. In general, the
shape of the response of such a shock on the output gap, inflation, property
price, and the real exchange rate are similar to an expansionary monetary
policy shock. The wide error band on the response to the property price
implies that little information is obtained about how this variable react to
a mix shock. For the interest response, the increase starting after about
the fifth quarter reflects perhaps monetary policymakers delayed response
to such a shock.
2.4.3 Application 3: Using long run interval restriction
In the final application, I let the VAR model take the bivariate specification
used in Gali (1999). The two variables included in the VAR model are
Xt = [∆xt,∆nt]
′, where xt denote the log of labor productivity and nt
the log of hours. For the two variables, structural shocks in the form of
a technology shocks and non-technology shocks are associated. The VAR
model is estimated on U.S. quarterly data for the period 1948:1-1994:1.
Proper identification of the bivariate model is of huge interest. This is
linked to the fact that the impulse response functions can generate empirical
evidence able to discriminate between the traditional New Keynesian (un-
der non accommodating monetary policy) and real business cycle (RBC)
models. The identification restriction enforced in Gali (1999) is the long
run neutrality restriction that only technology shocks can have a permanent
effect on the level of labor productivity.14
14Both the identifying restriction and other various issues related to the specification
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Figure 2.3: Estimated impulse responses with 16 and 84 percent error bands
for monetary policy shock and exchange rate shock.
If one maintain the criticism against long run restrictions discussed ear-
lier, namely that such restrictions will not hold exactly due to the approxi-
mate nature of the VAR. A more robust identifying restriction would be to
replace the long run restriction with an interval restriction at the distant
horizon. It is noteworthy that such an approach, in addition, will be able
to mitigate some of the problems raised in Uhlig (2004), where it is claimed
that other structural shocks than technology shock could influence the level
of labor productivity in the long run. The restriction used here is that a
non-technology shock, after two and half years (i.e. ten periods), can not
of the model have been discussed a lot in the literature (“the technology-hours debate”).
See Gali and Rabanal (2004) for a survey related to some of these issues.
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influence the level of labor productivity more than 0.20 (percent).
The distribution of impulse response functions by the use of such an
interval restriction is displayed in figure 2.3. The figure confirms the main
result in Gali (1999), namely that following a technology shock there is
an immediate and significant decline in the use of hours. Such a result is
the same as the response in a baseline New-Keynesian DSGE model with
non-accommodating monetary policy, but at odds with the response from a
traditional RBC model.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper it is argued that using an identification scheme that combines
the use short run and sign restrictions could provides the researcher with a
more flexible and powerful way to identify a VAR. In particular, the argu-
ments are related to the fact that the identification scheme proposed here
can incorporate all the types of prior information used in the earlier schemes.
For the empirical validation of DSGE models, such a result is of interest since
an identified VAR can be used as a selection criteria to choose among com-
peting DSGE models, and for the estimation of a particular DSGE model’s
structural parameters.
Within the scheme proposed, prior information in the form of short run
and sign restrictions can be directly implemented. For the case of long run
neutrality restrictions, I suggest that they should be implemented using sign
restrictions in the form of an interval restriction around zero at a distant
horizon. In total, such an approach will be able to mitigate the main prob-
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lems associated to the identification schemes commonly used to identify a
VAR: By not having to pick a full set of short run restrictions, the researcher
has the opportunity to select among the most reliable ones. Interval restric-
tions would better serve the fact that estimated VAR is only an approximate
estimate of the economic system. While for pure sign restrictions, with the
enforcement of the other types of prior information, there will be less need
to enforce numerous sign restrictions in order to obtain accurate results.
Thought it is difficult at this stage to say anything about the extent
of the use of such a scheme. The paper provides three applications that
clearly illustrates the use of such a scheme: In the first application, we see
that achieving identification using a combination of short run and sign re-
strictions provided evidence of strong interaction between monetary policy
and the exchange rate and a response to monetary policy shock consistent
with Dornbusch’s traditional overshooting hypothesis. In the second appli-
cation, a bank lending shock is shown to cause interesting disruptions to
the economy. In the final application, achieving identification using interval
restriction did not change the main conclusion in Gali (1999), i.e that hours
fall following a technology shock.
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Essay 2: How does monetary policy
respond to exchange rate movements? New
international evidence
Joint with Hilde C. Bjørnland
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how monetary policy responds to exchange rate move-
ments in open economies, and pays particular attention to the two-way inter-
action between monetary policy and exchange rate movements. We address
this issue using a structural VAR model that is identified using a combina-
tion of sign and short-term (zero) restrictions. Our suggested identification
scheme allows for a simultaneous reaction between the variables that are
observed to respond intraday to news (the interest rate and the exchange
rate), but maintains the recursive order for the traditional macroeconomic
variables (GDP and inflation). Doing so, we find strong interaction between
monetary policy and exchange rate variation. In particular, monetary policy
responds immediately (within the quarter) to an exchange rate shock. Fur-
thermore, we find the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates to
be non-trivial, suggesting instant, rather than delayed, overshooting. These
results are in contrast to what has been found previously in the literature.
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3.1 Introduction
In 2001, John B. Taylor wrote: “An important and still unsettled issue for
monetary policy in open economies is how much of an interest-rate reac-
tion there should be to the exchange rate in a monetary regime of a flexible
exchange rate, an inflation target, and a monetary policy rule.” (Taylor
(2001)).
Eight years on, the issue still remains unsettled. Yet, several times a
year, the board of an inflation-targeting central bank meets to analyze the
development of a series of economic variables, including the exchange rate.
For a small open economy, the exchange rate plays a crucial role in relation to
monetary policy. It plays a significant part in the formulation of monetary
policy (being an important influence on the overall level of demand and
prices), and is itself also influenced by monetary policy. Understanding the
role of the exchange rate in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
as well as quantifying the appropriate interest rate reaction to exchange rate
fluctuations, is therefore imperative to the implementation of an efficient
monetary policy strategy.
This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary policy and the
exchange rate in six open (inflation-targeting) countries, focusing in partic-
ular on how monetary policy has responded to exchange rate movements.
We address this issue using a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model
that is identified using a combination of sign and short-run (zero) restric-
tions which preserves the endogenous interaction between the interest rate
and the exchange rate commonly observed in the market. The novel feature
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of our approach is that, instead of the conventional view of using a recur-
sive Cholesky ordering for all of the variables, or the more recent view of
relying on only on pure sign restrictions, we combine the two approaches
in an intuitive way. That is, we allow for a simultaneous reaction between
the variables that are observed to respond intraday to news (the interest
rate and the exchange rate), but maintain the Cholesky recursive order for
the traditional macroeconomic variables that are observed to respond with
delay to economic shocks (output, inflation etc.). Identified in this way, we
believe the VAR approach is likely to give very useful information about
monetary policy and exchange rate dynamics in the open economy that
previous studies have been unable to recover.
Up to now, the standard approach for analyzing monetary policy re-
sponses has been to estimate interest rate rules like the simple Taylor rule.
For the closed economies, Taylor rules are often estimated using a single
equation framework that quantifies the actual interest rate response to ob-
served changes in economic variables such as inflation and the output gap,
see e.g. Taylor (1999) for an overview. For open economies, the Taylor rule is
frequently augmented to also include the exchange rate. However, the com-
monly observed simultaneity between the interest rate and the exchange
rate implies that the policy rule needs to be estimated simultaneously with
a reaction function for the exchange rate. In most cases this is not trivial,
and parameters often end up being insignificant.
More recently, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Dong (2008) have in-
stead favored a multivariate approach when estimating policy rules in the
open economy. Using Bayesian estimation techniques and dynamic stochas-
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tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, they estimate whether monetary
policy responds to exchange rate movements. In contrast to the single equa-
tion approaches, both find that the interest rate increases systematically in
all countries following an exchange rate depreciation. However, the degree of
response varies with the assumption underlying the exchange rate behavior.
While Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) find a modest interest rate response by
assuming the exchange rate follows an exogenous AR process, Dong (2008)
reports substantially more evidence using an endogenous specification for
the exchange rate.
The focus of this paper will be to specify multivariate VARs to analyze
policy reaction (operationalized through short-term interest rates) to shocks
in the exchange rate. By investigating the impulse responses and variance
decomposition of the policy instrument in response to the identified shocks,
one can get an idea of how central banks use the instrument to reach their
goals. While this is not the same as estimating interest rate rules, we believe
that the information as to how the interest rates actually react to shocks
to be equally interesting, and more to the point, in describing how central
banks implement policy. Furthermore, the empirical results may be an im-
portant addition to the more theoretically driven structural model responses
derived in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Dong (2008), where the chosen
exchange rate specification will influence the results. The paper therefore
contributes with new empirical evidence, as well as providing a methodolog-
ical contribution on how one can identify monetary policy and exchange rate
shocks in the open economy.
The analysis is applied to six open economies with floating exchange
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rates: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the UK. In all
countries, the results suggest that the interest rate increases systematically
in response to a shock that depreciates the exchange rate. Furthermore,
we find the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates to be non-
trivial. In particular, following a contractionary monetary policy shock, the
exchange rate appreciates on impact. The exchange rate then gradually de-
preciates back to baseline, broadly consistent with UIP. These results are in
contrast to the results that have been found previously in the literature us-
ing recursive restrictions, or, pure sign restrictions, to identify the structural
VARs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and presents our
suggested identification scheme (the Cholesky-sign decomposition) that is
used to identify the shocks. In Section 3 we present the empirical results
and discuss robustness. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Identifying monetary policy responses in the
structural VAR model
Structural VAR models are increasingly being used as a method to analyze
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Typically, the focus is on iden-
tifying the unsystematic monetary policy shocks and tracing out the effects
of these shocks on various macroeconomic and financial variables.2 However,
2See e.g. Sims (1980), Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1999b, 2005a) for an analysis of the closed economy (i.e. the U.S.), Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) for an analysis of open economies and Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009)
for an analysis of the stock market.
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while the method has been successful in providing a consensus with regard
to the effects of monetary policy in the closed economy, VAR studies of the
open economy have provided several puzzles, in particular with regard to
the effects on the exchange rate. For instance, following a contractionary
monetary policy shock, the exchange rate is seen to depreciate, or if it appre-
ciates, it does so for a prolonged period of up to three years, thereby giving
a hump-shaped response that violates uncovered interest parity (UIP).3
A major challenge when analyzing monetary policy in the open economy,
though, is how to identify the structural shocks when there is simultaneity
between the interest rate and the exchange rate. Most of the traditional
VAR studies of the open economies ignore this simultaneity, by placing re-
cursive, contemporaneous restrictions on the interaction between monetary
policy and the exchange rate. Typically, they either assume a lagged re-
sponse in the systematic monetary policy setting to exchange rate news
(see e.g. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Peersman and Smets (2003) and
Linde´ (2003)), or a lagged response in the exchange rate to monetary policy
shocks (see e.g. Kim (2002)4 and Mojon and Peersman (2003)). However,
both restrictions are potentially wrong. The first as it prevents the poli-
cymaker from using all the current information when designing monetary
policy. There is, however, no a priori reason for why the monetary poli-
cymakers should disregard news on the exchange rate among all available
information when deciding the appropriate interest rate response. Further-
3In the literature, the first phenomenon has been referred to as the exchange rate
puzzle, whereas the second is termed delayed overshooting (or forward discount puzzle),
see Cushman and Zha (1997).
4For some of the countries Kim (2002) also experiments with the reverse restrictions,
i.e. that monetary policy responds to the exchange rate with a lag.
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more, the restriction is useless for the purpose of our study, which seeks to
quantify this policy response. The second restriction is equally implausible,
as it imposes strong restrictions on the flexibility of the exchange rate. Daily
observations in the market, as well as formal empirical evidence using among
others (non-VAR) event studies, typically suggest that the exchange rate re-
sponds instantaneously to news, including monetary policy shocks (see e.g.
Bonser-Neal, Roley, and Sellon (1998), Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and
Manners (2006) among others).
The issue of identification has not gone unattended. In an early attempt
to solve the puzzle, Cushman and Zha (1997) suggest that one should iden-
tify monetary policy shocks in a simultaneous environment, using a systems
method of estimation. The paper analyzes Canada prior to the inflation
targeting period (the analysis ends in 1993), and is distinct from our pa-
per in that they specify a VAR model with tightly estimated equations for
money demand, money supply and the exchange rate. Hence, monetary
policy is identified through innovations in the money supply equation rather
than through an interest rate equation as we do here. Nevertheless, the
paper is relevant as it finds much more evidence of simultaneous responses
for Canada than traditionally found in the literature.
More recently, Faust and Rogers (2003) have used sign restrictions to
test the implications of the short-run (zero) restrictions commonly applied.
Doing so they find that traditional VARs may have produced a numerically
important bias in the estimate of the degree of interdependence. By relaxing
the zero restrictions, they find that the exchange rate can appreciate on
impact. However, their approach of relying of pure sign restriction can
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not identify the precise exchange rate responses to the monetary policy
shocks, which could be immediate or delayed. To do so, one needs to apply
additional restrictions, or, allow the sign restrictions imposed to be effective
for a prolonged period. An example of the latter is found in Uhlig and Scholl
(2005), where they impose sign restrictions for up to a year after the shocks.
Doing so, however, they find no evidence of instant overshooting.
An obstacle with the approach of relying on pure sign restrictions when
identifying a structural VAR model, is that the identification scheme will be
non-unique. This has been emphasized by Fry and Pagan (2007), who show
that due to the weakness of information contained in the sign restrictions,
there will be many impulse responses that can satisfy each sign restric-
tion. When a series of impulse responses are compatible with a particular
restriction, identification will not be exact. Canova and Paustian (2007)
and Paustian (2007a) have further shown that sign restrictions can only
uniquely pin down the unconstrained impulse responses when the imposed
restrictions are sufficiently numerous. Otherwise, the use of sign restrictions
could lead to the identified shock being a hybrid of shocks, lacking clear
economic interpretation.
In this paper we suggest combining sign and short-run (zero) restric-
tions (the Cholesky-Sign decomposition) to identify the VAR. In particular,
we explicitly account for the interdependence between monetary policy and
exchange rate movements within a VAR model by applying the following
sign restriction: Following a contractionary monetary policy shock (that in-
creases the interest rate), the exchange rate has to fall immediately (i.e.
appreciate). Such a response is consistent with formal empirical evidence
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from among others the event studies cited above.5 It seems therefore rea-
sonable to assume that the restriction is uncontroversial. Note that in the
periods following the initial response, the exchange rate is free to move in
any direction. That is, we do not place any restrictions on whether the max-
imum response should be immediate or delayed. This way we can test for
any evidence of delayed overshooting within our present framework. Finally,
and at the core of this paper, by restricting the response in the exchange
rate only, we leave the issue of how monetary policy responds to exchange
rate movements open for testing.
Once allowing for a contemporaneous relationship between the interest
rate and the exchange rate, the remaining VAR will be identified using
standard recursive zero restrictions on the impact matrix of shocks that
are commonly used in the closed economy literature, see e.g. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999b). That is, we identify a recursive structure
between domestic macroeconomic variables and monetary policy, so that
monetary policy can react to all shocks, but the macroeconomic variables
(such as output and inflation) react with a lag to monetary policy shocks.
These restrictions are less controversial, and studies identifying monetary
policy without these restrictions have found qualitatively similar results:
see for example Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004). Furthermore, they
provide for an unique identification with regard to pinning down the effects
of monetary policy on the the various macroeconomic variables.
5It is also in line with results found in Bjørnland (2008), using instead long run (neu-
trality) restrictions to identify the VAR.
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3.2.1 The Cholesky-sign identification scheme
The choice of variables included in the VAR model is based on small open
economies with a New-Keynesian framework, such as described in Svensson
(2000) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). Formally, the variables to be
included consist of Xt = [i
∗
t , yt, pit, it, ret]
′, where i∗t is the foreign short-term
nominal interest rate, yt is the log of real GDP, pit, is the log of the price
differential within a year, it the short-term nominal interest rate, and ret
the log of the country’s real exchange rate.
The five variables can be estimated jointly in the reduced form VAR(p),
which in matrix form (ignoring any deterministic terms) can be expressed
as
A(L)Xt = et, with Σe = E(ete
′
t), (3.1)
A(L) is here a (5x5) matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, A(L) =∑p
i=0AiL
i with A0 = I5. et is the one step ahead prediction error which is
assumed to be normally distributed with a positive semidefinite covariance
matrix Σe. Given that A(L) is invertible, the VAR model can also be written
in terms of its moving average (MA) representation:
Xt = B(L)et, (3.2)
where B(L) = A(L)−1.
We assume that the error term et is linearly related to a vector of five
independent structural shocks specified as εt = [ε
i∗
t , ε
y
t , ε
pi
t , ε
mp
t , ε
ex
t ]
′. It is
common to loosely identify εi
∗
t as foreign interest rate shocks, ε
y
t as output
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shocks and εpit as inflation shocks (or cost-push shocks). For the latter two
shocks (the main focus of this paper), εmpt represents monetary policy shocks
and εext refers to real exchange rate shocks. If we normalize the structural
shocks to have unit variance, the relationship between the error term and
structural shocks can be written as
et = Aεt, with I5 = E(εtε
′
t). (3.3)
By substituting for equation (3.3) into (3.2), the model can be written in
the form of a structural MA-representation
Xt = C(L)εt, (3.4)
where C(L) = B(L)A. In order to derive the impulse responses and the
variance decomposition, the matrix A needs to be identified. So far the only
restriction on A comes from equation (3.3) that implies
Σe = E(ete
′
t) = AE(εtε
′
t)A
′ = AA′. (3.5)
There are, however, many different decompositions satisfying AA′ =
∑
e,
hence we do not have a unique MA representation in terms of the structural
shocks. We know, however, that for two different decompositions, Σe = AA
′
and Σe = A˜A˜′, it must be the case that A = A˜Q with Q being an orthogonal
matrix, i.e. QQ′ = I5. A property of this type of matrix is that the columns
Q = [q1, ..., q5] are orthonormal which tells us that its vectors are mutually
perpendicular, i.e. < qi, qj >= 0 for i 6= j, and of unit length, i.e. ||qi||=1.
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For the case of our small open economy model, we will identify the matrix
A by using a combination of a Cholesky and sign identification approach.
Technically, it amounts to partitioning the matrix Xt into two blocks of vari-
ables where the relationship among the structural shocks of the first block
is cast in a recursive order while for the second block, a contemporaneous
relationship among the structural shocks is allowed for. For our model, the
two blocks are specified to be X1t = [i
∗
t , yt, pit]
′ and X2t = [it, ret]′. If we
select A˜ = Ac, where Ac is equal to the lower triangular product of the
Cholesky decomposition, one can verify that the block structure forces Q to
be restricted to Qr such that the relationship between the error term and
the structural shock now can be written as
Aεt = A
cQrεt =

ac11 0 0 0 0
ac21 a
c
22 0 0 0
ac31 a
c
32 a
c
32 0 0
ac41 a
c
42 a
c
43 a
c
44 0
ac51 a
c
52 a
c
53 a
c
54 a
c
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

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 cos(θ) − sin(θ)
0 0 0 sin(θ) cos(θ)


εi
∗
t
εyt
εpit
εmpt
εext

From this setup one should note that the zero elements on the fourth and
fifth column of Qr together with the multiplication of the Cholesky decom-
position imply that monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks will
be restricted so that they have a non-immediate (zero contemporaneous)
impact on the variables belonging in X1t. For monetary policy shocks we
find this to be appropriate since it represents the conventional view used in
the closed economy literature (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999b)),
namely that monetary policy can react immediately to macroeconomic vari-
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ables (such as output and inflation), while such a relationship does not exist
the other way around (i.e. macroeconomic variables react with a lag to
policy shocks).6 Similar assumptions pertain to the exchange rate shocks:
The exchange rate can react immediately to all shocks, but due to nominal
rigidities, there is a slow process of exchange rate pass through to macroe-
conomic variables. Regarding the ordering of the first three variables, we
will show that the effects of the monetary policy shocks (or the exchange
rate shocks) will be invariant to how these variables are ordered. This fol-
lows from a generalization of proposition 4.1 in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999b), and is discussed further in the robustness section below.
For our second block of variables, we allow for contemporaneous interac-
tions between the interest rate and the exchange rate. By varying the value
of θ around the unit circle (0, 2pi), all potential contemporaneous relation-
ships can be traced out. To identify the monetary policy shocks, we then
impose one sign restriction, namely the conditional overshooting hypothesis
that a monetary contraction will be met by an immediate appreciation of
the real exchange rate.7
3.2.2 Estimation and inference
To estimate the model, we adopt a Bayesian approach. As shown in Uhlig
(2005), such an approach is computationally simple and allows for a concep-
6Having the foreign interest rate in the recursive block should neither be controversial,
since shocks to the domestic variables in a small open economy are usually assumed to
have little or no influence on foreign variables, at least on impact.
7Note that, due to the mutually perpendicular property ofQr(θ), this restriction implies
that an unexpected appreciation of the exchange rate must have an immediate non-positive
impact on the interest rate.
64
tually clean way of drawing error bands for the statistics of interest (such as
impulse responses and variance decomposition). The prior for our reduced
form coefficients and covariance matrix is chosen to be non-informative. We
let θ have a uniform prior specified as U(0, 2pi).
Within this setting the first three shocks of our VAR model will be
identified using the Cholesky decomposition based only on draws from the
posterior VAR. For the last two shocks, however, a sign restriction approach
must be implemented as in Uhlig (2005). That is, for each of the draw from
the VAR posterior we make a uniform draw for θ, calculate the impulse
responses and check whether our sign restriction is satisfied. If this is the
case, we keep the draw; otherwise the draw is discarded. Error bands are
then calculated based on all the draws that are accepted. The number of
accepted draws from the posterior is set to be 1000.
3.3 Empirical results using Cholesky-sign identifi-
cation
The model is estimated for six countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden and the UK, using quarterly data from 1983Q1 to 2004Q4
(see the appendix). Using an earlier starting period will make it hard to iden-
tify a stable monetary policy regime, as monetary policy prior to 1983 has
undergone important structural changes and unusual operating procedures
(see Bagliano and Favero (1998) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)).
Consistent with most other related studies, the variables, with the ex-
ception of prices, are specified in levels. Rather than including prices, we
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include a measure of inflation, calculated as annual changes in the CPI.
We have chosen to focus on annual inflation as it is a direct measure of
the monetary policy target in inflation-targeting countries. One may argue
(Giordani (2004)) that with the theoretical model of Svensson (1997) as a
data-generating process, rather than including output in levels, one should
either include the output gap in the VAR, or the output gap along with the
trend level of output. However, as pointed out by Linde´ (2003), a practi-
cal point that Giordani does not address is how to compute trend output
(thereby also the output gap). To overcome this issue, we therefore instead
follow Linde´ (2003) and include a linear trend in the VAR along with out-
put in levels. In that way we try to address this problem by modelling the
trend implicit in the VAR. However, as will be seen in the robustness sec-
tion below, excluding the trend does not change the main results. We choose
four lags for all countries. Again, we will show that results are robust to
alternative lag orders.
3.3.1 The effects of monetary policy shocks
Figures 1-6 show, for each of the six countries: Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the UK respectively, the effect of the mone-
tary policy shock (in the left column) on all five variables and the effect of
an exchange rate shock (in the right column) on the same variables, using
the Cholesky-sign identification scheme. The solid line represents the me-
dian response of the error bands for the impulse responses, while the dotted
lines are the 16 and 84 percentiles. Before analyzing the systematic mone-
tary policy response to exchange rate shocks, we discuss the effects of the
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unsystematic monetary policy shocks on all macroeconomic variables (left
column).
Figure 3.1: Australia: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks
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The figures suggest that a contractionary monetary policy shock (that
increases the interest rate temporarily) has the usual effects identified in
other international studies. In particular, output falls gradually for 1-2 years
before the effects essentially die out. The effect on inflation is also eventually
negative as expected and reaches its minimum after 2-3 years. However,
for some countries, and in particular the UK, there is some evidence that
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Figure 3.2: Canada: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks
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consumer prices increase initially, commonly referred to as the price puzzle.8
Though, in most cases, this initial response is not significant.
There is a high degree of interest-rate inertia in the model, in the sense
that a monetary policy shock is only offset by a gradual reduction in the
interest rate. The interest rate response is consistent with what has become
known as good monetary policy conduct (see Woodford (2003b)). In partic-
8The puzzle has often been explained by a cost channel of the interest rate, where part
of the increase in firms’ borrowing costs is offset by an increase in prices (Ravenna and
Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Hoffmann, and Schabert (2006)).
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Figure 3.3: New Zealand: The response to monetary policy shocks and
exchange rate shocks
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ular, interest-rate inertia is known to let the policymaker smooth the effects
of policy over time by affecting private-sector expectations. Moreover, the
reversal of the interest rate stance is consistent with the policymaker trying
to offset the adverse effects of the initial policy deviation from the systematic
part of policy.
Regarding the exchange rate, the figures show that in all countries the
exchange rate appreciates on impact (as assumed). However, the response
is far from trivial. The median response indicates that the exchange rate
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Figure 3.4: Norway: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks
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may fall by approximately 2.5-4 percent, following (a normalized) one per-
centage point increase in the interest rate. Furthermore, following the initial
effect, the exchange rate thereafter gradually depreciates back to baseline,
consistent with the Dornbusch overshooting hypothesis. In most cases, the
maximum effect is felt initially, or at most, delayed by one quarter. This
seems to be a robust feature of the data, as indicated by the 16-84 percentiles
error band around the median responses.
Hence, we find no evidence of delay overshooting that has often been
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Figure 3.5: Sweden: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks
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found in open economy VAR applications identified using recursive restric-
tions. Instead, our results are consistent with main conclusion from Faust
and Rogers (2003) which, using sign restrictions only, could not rule out that
there was an early peak in the exchange rate following a monetary policy
shock.9 However, whereas they could not determine whether the maximum
9In contrast, Uhlig and Scholl (2005) find no evidence of overshooting, also using sign
restrictions. However, by restricting, among others, domestic prices from rising (thereby
avoiding “price puzzle” by construction), they find instead puzzling responses in the other
variables, as real output rises and the real exchange rate depreciates on impact following
a contractionary monetary policy shock. These impulse responses are hard to interpret
as all resulting from a contractionary monetary shock, making us question whether the
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Figure 3.6: UK: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange rate
shocks
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response was immediate or delayed, our results suggest the maximum re-
sponse to be within a quarter. This result of instant overshooting is also
consistent with findings in Bjørnland (2006, 2008) and Cushman and Zha
(1997), using either long-run (neutrality) restrictions or a structural ap-
proach to identify the VARs. Finally, the magnitude of the response found
here is consistent with (non-VAR) event studies that measure the immedi-
ate response of the exchange rate to shocks associated with particular policy
identified shocks could be a hybrid of shocks, lacking clear economic interpretations.
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actions. For instance, Zettelmeyer (2004) analyzing Australia, Canada and
New Zealand using daily data, finds that a one percentage point increase in
the interest rate will appreciate the exchange rate on impact by 2-3 percent.
Kearns and Manners (2006) using intraday data for the same three countries
plus the UK find similar results, although the magnitude of the effects of the
shocks is somewhat smaller. Hence, we feel confident to conclude that by
allowing the interest rate and the exchange rate to respond simultaneously
to news, the exchange rate behaves closer to economic theory than previous
VAR studies have reported.
3.3.2 Does monetary policy respond to exchange rate shocks?
Having examined the response in the variables to a (unsystematic) monetary
policy shock, we now turn to address the core question in this paper, namely
how does the instrument of monetary policy, i.e. the interest rate, react to
an exchange rate shock (right column)?
All the figures 1-6 emphasize that following an exchange rate shock that
depreciates (increase) the real exchange rate by one percent, interest rates
increase by 20-40 basis points. In all countries, the maximum interest rate
response is immediate and then dies quickly out, within a year or so. Hence,
if the central banks respond to an exchange rate shock, they do so mainly
within a year. Failing to account for this interaction will therefore probably
bias all other results.
Interestingly, the interest rate response could be (indirectly) related to
the effect of the exchange rate on inflation, which increases temporarily in
most countries. Output, on the other hand, responds very little at first,
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but as the monetary contraction intensifies, it starts to fall. Eventually
monetary policy is eased, and output returns to equilibrium.
Are these results plausible? Much of the theoretical research to date
indicates that monetary policy rules that react directly to the exchange rate
(in addition to inflation and output) do not work much better in stabilizing
inflation and real output than policy rules that do not react to the exchange
rate (see Taylor (2001) and the references stated therein).10 However, Taylor
(2001) also points out that although there may be no evidence that the
central bank follows a policy rule with a direct exchange rate effect, theory
still suggests that there may be strong indirect effects of exchange rates on
interest rates.
Such indirect effect can be the consequence of a monetary policy rule
based on forecasts on future variables or with a rational expectation model
for the term term structure of the interest rate. In both cases, inertia in
the monetary transmission mechanism (i.e. unexpected exchange rate move-
ments work with a lag on inflation and output) will make the interest rate
respond to exchange rate movements through the effect this variable has on
the expectations of future output and inflation. Consistent with this, some
inflation-targeting central banks have argued that they specifically look at
the exchange rate to assess to what extent it will impact on import prices
and hence the inflation forecast, see e.g. Heikensten (1998) on Sveriges
10For instance, normative studies like Ball (1999) finds that although a depreciation of
the exchange rate of 1 percent would call for an immediate interest rate response of 37
basis points, the effect would be partially offset by 15 basis points the period after. Similar
responses are also suggested in Svensson (2000), but there the response is totally offset
the next period.
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Riksbank.11
Hence, central banks may want to respond to real exchange rate move-
ments in order to smooth international relative price fluctuations that could
affect their international competitiveness and have an effect on aggregate
demand for domestic goods, which is consistent with what we found here.
This is also the inherent feature of the recent work by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007), which using a DSGE model finds that in two of the four countries
they examine (Canada and the UK), the central banks include the exchange
rate in their policy rules. Using a similar model, but allowing the exchange
rate to be endogenously determined, Dong (2008) finds larger responses, as
measured by the marginal likelihood values. Now the Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England have all responded to
real exchange rate movements in the past.
To sum up. To the extent that we can interpret our responses as sys-
tematic responses, we have found clear evidences of strong and simultaneous
reactions between monetary policy and the exchange rate, similar in mag-
nitude to those that were found in Dong (2008) and somewhat larger than
those that were found in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
Finally, we examine the quantified contribution of the different shocks
to the variance in the interest rate at different horizons. That is, Table
1 displays for each country the variance decomposition of the interest rate
11Heikensten (1998) writes (p.1): In this context I should like to elaborate on the
Riksbank’s appraisal of the Swedish krona... The Riksbank does not target the krona’s
exchange rate. But as one of the factors behind inflation, the exchange rate is important
for monetary policy in a flexible exchange rate regime. A considerable period with a weak
exchange rate might lead to a forecast rate of inflation that exceeds the target, in which
case the Riksbank has to respond in order to meet this target.
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with respect to the (median) effect of the different shocks. We focus on
the effect on impact, after four quarters and after eight quarters. The table
demonstrates that the exchange rate explains a large share (34-47 percent) of
the variation in the interest rate on impact. In fact, in four of the countries,
Australia, Canada, Norway and the UK, the exchange rate shocks are the
most important shocks for explaining the variation in the interest rate on
impact. However, the contribution of these shocks thereafter quickly dies
out, so that after one year, the exchange rate shocks explain close to 20
percent of the interest rate variation in all countries but Sweden and the
UK, where it contributes with 30 percent. However, after two years, the
contribution has declined to 15-25 percent in all countries. These results are
consistent with Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Dong (2008), who found
that the exchange rate played an important role in the monetary policy
setting in countries such as Canada and the UK (but less so in New Zealand).
Interestingly, the countries that respond the most are all resource-intensive
countries, where the export sector plays a large role in the economy.
Hence, we can conclude that the interest rate responds systematically to
exchange rate shocks. However, as suggested above, this does not necessar-
ily imply that the exchange rate has an independent role in the monetary
policy rule, other than indirectly as a leading indicator for variables such
as inflation. The magnitude of the response, however, indicates that the
exchange rate is an important variable in the interest rate determination.
Furthermore, accounting for this interaction may be important when iden-
tifying monetary policy in open economies. In particular, VAR studies that
assume a lagged response in (the systematic) monetary policy setting to
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exchange rate news would most likely underestimate the monetary policy
responses, as well as underestimate the role of the exchange rate in the the
monetary policy transmission. This issue is explored further in the next
section.
3.3.3 Comparing Cholesky-sign with Cholesky identification
If monetary policy reacts immediately to exchange rate shocks and the ex-
change rate reacts on impact to monetary policy shock, then one would
expect the interaction between interest rates and exchange rates to be im-
portant when identifying the various shocks. Below we examine the impli-
cations of our restrictions versus a pure Cholesky decomposition where we
restrict the interest rate to respond to exchange rate shocks with a lag.
Figures 7 gives a comparison of the recursive Cholesky identification
and our suggested Cholesky-sign restriction for Canada. The results for the
other countries are very similar and can be obtained on request. Note that
solid line is the impulse responses found using the Cholesky decomposition
with the exchange rate now ordered below the interest rate, while the dotted
line is the median response following our suggested Cholesky-sign decom-
position. For ease of exposition, the effect of the monetary policy shock
(left column) is normalized to increase the interest rate by one percentage
point initially, while the exchange rate shock (right column) is normalized
to increase (depreciate) the exchange rate by one percent initially.
Starting with the effects of a monetary policy shock (left columns). The
figure demonstrates that when monetary policy is identified using the tradi-
tional recursive Cholesky identification, there is virtually no exchange rate
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Figure 3.7: Canada: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Cholesky versus Cholesky-sign
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response to a monetary policy shock.12 Recall that to obtain these responses,
we have restricted the interest rate from responding initially to exchange rate
shocks. However, since our suggested Cholesky-sign identification found ex-
actly the opposite, i.e. monetary policy will react immediately to exchange
rate shocks, one could expect the interaction between interest rates and
exchange rates to be important when identifying monetary policy shocks.
12Similar results are also found for Australia, Canada, Norway and the UK, while for
the remaining two countries (New Zealand and Sweden), the exchange rate responds on
impact, but shows evidence of delay overshooting
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Failing to account for this interaction may therefore likely have biased the
results.
The right column, mapping out the effects of the exchange rate shocks,
illustrates this. The figures suggest that when the recursive Cholesky identi-
fication is used, the interest rate does not respond to an exchange rate shock,
even after a year. Hence, whereas the Cholesky-sign identification has un-
covered a clear interaction between the interest rate and the exchange rate,
the conventional Cholesky identification would fail to recover any simultane-
ity between the interest rate and the exchange rate. This is important, as
many researchers would argue that by restricting the policy response from
responding by one period only, one can still allow possible monetary pol-
icy reactions to the exchange rate, but with a lag. However, as suggested
from the figures above, the policy reaction will in most cases be severely
underestimated.
Finally, note also that when the Cholesky identification is used, the
effect of the monetary policy shock on the remaining variables will also be
underestimated, suggesting less of an inflation and output response relative
to the median response found using the Cholesky-sign identification. Hence,
accounting for an interaction between monetary policy and the exchange
rate is imperative not only for estimating the systematic response in the
interest rate to exchange rate shocks, but also for establishing the role of
the exchange rate in the monetary policy transmission.
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3.3.4 Robustness
Below we check robustness of our results by performing the following alter-
ations to the: (i) model specification, (ii) lags, (iii) order of variables in the
Cholesky decomposition, (iv) additional variables, (v) exogenous variables
and (vi) sample stability. In more detail, we first examine two alterative
model specifications. We estimate the model in levels but without the trend
and we check robustness to the lag order, using two instead of four lags in
the estimated VAR. We then test robustness to the order of variables in the
recursive (Cholesky) block. That is, we reverse the order of the first three
variables, so that inflation is ordered above output which is ordered above
the foreign interest rate. Now output and inflation will respond with a lag
to both domestic and foreign monetary policy. Next we check robustness to
the inclusion of an oil price. An objection to our set up is that many of the
countries examined are net oil exporters (in particular Canada, Norway and
the UK). By including the oil price, we can examine if oil is an important
contributor to exchange rate variations. To save on the degrees of freedom,
we let the oil price be exogenous to the VAR (since these are small countries
with little effect on oil prices), although allowing it to enter as an endoge-
nous variable provides about the same results. We then check robustness to
how we have included the foreign interest rate. Since the countries in our
sample are small open economies, they have little effect (if any at all) on
the foreign interest rate. We can therefore allow the foreign interest to be
exogenous to the VAR. Finally, we re-estimate the model from 1988, using
all variables. The period after 1988 is considered to be a more stable mon-
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etary policy regime, with more countries adopting inflation-targeting as a
monetary policy strategy. Due to the relatively short sample, we let GDP,
inflation, interest rates and exchange rate be endogenous (using two lags
in the VAR), while the foreign interest rate and oil prices are included as
exogenous variables.
Figures 8-13 in Appendix A graph the impulse responses from the ro-
bustness exercises respectively. The results are illustrated for Canada, but
similar findings can be obtained for the other countries at request. Clearly
the main results are robust to these changes. In particular, the interde-
pendence between monetary policy and exchange rate fluctuations remains
intact. The main changes are found when we remove the trend from the
analysis, as now the effect of monetary policy on output is more persistent
than in the basic case. However, this is not surprising as the relevant mea-
sure in the central bank’s reaction function is the output gap, and not the
level of output.
Regarding the test of the ordering of the first three variables, the re-
sults remain unchanged. This is interesting, as it suggests that the order
of the variables in the recursive block does not play any role. This follows
from a generalization of the well known findings in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999b). There, proposition 4.1 states that when the monetary
policy variable (the interest rate) is ordered last in a Cholesky ordering,
the responses to the monetary policy shock will be invariant to the order-
ing of the variables above the interest rate. Instead, the ordering of the
variables above the policy equation becomes a computational convenience
with no bite. The real bite here is the short-term (zero) restriction that
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the first three variables in the VAR do not respond contemporaneously to a
monetary policy shock. The same argument will hold for the exchange rate
shock since the first three variables do not respond contemporaneously to
this shock either.
3.4 Conclusions
Empirical evidence using intraday data has shown that exchange rates react
immediately to news, including news about monetary policy. If monetary
policy also reacts quickly to surprise changes in the exchange rate, one would
expect the interaction between interest rates and exchange rates to be im-
portant in applied analysis of monetary policy.
This paper has demonstrated that monetary policy and exchange rate
interaction matter. By estimating VAR models that are identified using a
combination of sign and short-term (zero) restrictions (the Cholesky-sign
identification), we have analyzed how monetary policy has responded to ex-
change rate movements in six open economies. Our suggested identification
preserves the contemporaneous interaction between the interest rate and the
exchange rate, without extensively deviating from the established literature
of identifying a monetary policy shock as an exogenous shock to an interest
rate reaction function.
The novel feature of such an approach is that, instead of the conventional
view of using a recursive Cholesky ordering for all of the variables, or the
more recent view of relying on only pure sign restrictions, we combine the
two approaches in an intuitive way. That is, we allow for a simultaneous
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reaction between the variables that are observed to respond intraday to
news (the interest rate and the exchange rate), but maintain the Cholesky
recursive order for the traditional macroeconomic variables that are observed
to respond with delay (output, inflation etc.) to economic shocks.
Doing so, we find great interaction between monetary policy and the
exchange rate. In particular, an exchange rate shock that depreciates the
exchange rate by one percent, increases the interest rate on impact (within
a quarter) by 20-40 basis points. Furthermore, we find the impact of mon-
etary policy shocks on exchange rates to be non-trivial and consistent with
Dornbusch overshooting. In particular, a contractionary monetary policy
shock that increases the interest rate by one percentage point, appreciates
the exchange rate on impact by 2.5-4 percent. The exchange rate thereafter
gradually depreciates back to baseline, broadly consistent with UIP. These
results are in contrast to what has been found previously in the literature us-
ing recursive restrictions, or, pure sign restrictions, to identify the structural
VARs.
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Table 3.1: Variance decomposition of the interest rate, 1, 4 and 8 quarter
horizon
Shocks Monetary policy shock Exchange rate shock Other shocks
AUSTRALIA
1-step 0.44 0.47 0.09
4-step 0.45 0.22 0.33
8-step 0.30 0.14 0.56
CANADA
1-step 0.30 0.41 0.29
4-step 0.21 0.15 0.64
8-step 0.19 0.18 0.63
NEW ZEALAND
1-step 0.42 0.38 0.20
4-step 0.25 0.19 0.56
8-step 0.16 0.16 0.68
NORWAY
1-step 0.33 0.39 0.28
4-step 0.22 0.18 0.60
8-step 0.17 0.13 0.70
SWEDEN
1-step 0.50 0.34 0.16
4-step 0.34 0.33 0.33
8-step 0.22 0.24 0.54
UNITED KINGDOM
1-step 0.34 0.42 0.24
4-step 0.36 0.32 0.32
8-step 0.29 0.23 0.48
84
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Data sources
All data are taken from the OECD database, except the Fed Funds rate that
is taken from Eco Win. GDP and inflation are seasonally adjusted (s.a.) by
the official sources, the remaining series are unadjusted. The following data
series are used:
(pit) Inflation, measured as annual changes in the consumer price index
(CPI).
(yt) Log real GDP, deflated by the official sources.
(ret) [CCRETT01.IXOB.Q] Log of the real effective exchange rate, mea-
sured against a basket of trading partners. The exchange rate is specified
so that an increase implies depreciation.
(it) [IR3TBB01.ST.Q] Three month domestic interest rate.
(i∗t ) Trade-weighted foreign interest rate. For Canada and the UK, the
foreign interest rate is represented by the Federal Funds rate, as the US
comprises more than 80 percent of the foreign trade weight. For Australia,
New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, the foreign interest is an weighted av-
erage of the interest rate in the major trading partners, source: Reserve
Bank of Australia (http://www.rba.gov.au/), Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/), Norges Bank (http://www.norges-bank.no) and
Sveriges Riksbank ( http://www.riksbank.com/) respectively.
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3.5.2 Robustness
Figure 3.8: Australia: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Cholesky versus Cholesky-sign
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Figure 3.9: Norway: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Cholesky versus Cholesky-sign
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Figure 3.10: New Zealand: The response to monetary policy shocks and
exchange rate shocks; Cholesky versus Cholesky-sign
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Figure 3.11: Sweden: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Cholesky versus Cholesky-sign
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Figure 3.12: UK: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange rate
shocks; Cholesky versus Cholesky-sign
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Figure 3.13: Canada: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Robustness: Model without trend
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Figure 3.14: Canada: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Robustness: Model with 2 lags
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Figure 3.15: Canada: The response to monetary policy shocks and exchange
rate shocks; Robustness: Alternative recursive order
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Essay 3: Monetary Policy, Risk Premium
and Portfolio Holdings in a Small Open
Economy
Joint with Michal Zdenek
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Abstract
In both the policy debate concerned with the desirability of a monetary
union and in the dynamic macroeconomic theory, exchange rate risk pre-
mium and nominal exchange rate uncertainty are perceived to have negative
welfare effects. For the policy debate, arguments linked to the theory of op-
timal currency areas are often referred to, while in modern macroeconomic
literature it is common to model the risk premium as an exogenous stochas-
tic process. In this paper, we make the risk premium and portfolio holdings
endogenous in a dynamic general equilibrium model of an small open econ-
omy and investigate the impact of monetary policy. Our results challenge
the conventional view of the risk premium and nominal exchange rate un-
certainty as factors that are distorting portfolio decisions of the agents in
an small open economy. 1
1We are grateful to Hilde C. Bjørnland, Øystein Thøgersen, Mikhail Golosov and par-
ticipants at NHH Macro Workshop for constructive comments.
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4.1 Introduction
A fundamental policy question for a small open economy (SOE) is what
kind of monetary policy regime it should adopt. Reflecting policy makers
uncertainty about this issue, most countries have over time practiced various
versions of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. More recently, the
policy question for many countries seems to have limited itself to a question
of whether to have an independent inflation target, or to form a part of a
monetary union.
The analysis of whether a country should join a monetary union naturally
attracts a lot of attention, both from policymakers and researchers. A clear
understanding of the welfare results that arise from such a decision is the
focus of interest. In the policy debate, welfare results from the literature
related to the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) typically still have
a strong influence. Researchers today, however, derive welfare results from
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models using a fully
micro-founded utility approach.
The welfare results from OCA theory are to some extent in line with
those derived from DSGE models when it comes to the ability of monetary
policy to bring the economy to its natural equilibrium level. In the theory of
OCA, this result is achieved by a discretionary policy in a IS-LM framework.2
Gali and Monacelli (2005) show that a somewhat similar result is obtained
in a DSGE framework for the case of a New Keynesian model of a SOE.
In this case, the implementation of a domestic inflation targeting rule will
2This was first highlighted in the pioneering work by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963)
and Kenen (1969)
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make the economy replicate its flexible price equilibrium.3
On the other hand, it is harder to bring together the welfare results from
OCA theory with those from DSGE models when it comes to how monetary
policy affects a country’s portfolio selection opportunities. The policy de-
bate seems to be particularly influenced by the theoretical analysis provided
in Mundell (1973) and Baldwin (1989). In Mundell (1973), exchange rate
uncertainty occurs outside a monetary union due to discretionary monetary
policy. The presence of exchange rate uncertainty implies that consump-
tion risk sharing through international capital market is limited because of
market incompleteness. Consequently, asymmetric productivity shocks need
to be absorbed mostly within the individual national economy. In Baldwin
(1989), it is proposed that savings could have a stronger impact on growth of
European economy than what typically is estimated. Baldwin (1989) forms
the basis of the Emerson, Gros, and Italianer (1992) report ’One Market,
One Money’, where it is argued that the elimination of exchange rate un-
certainty and the risk premium in a monetary union would lower the real
interest rate which would imply more savings and thereby higher economic
growth.
In the literature on the welfare analysis of a SOE using DSGE models, the
ability of monetary policy to affect a country’s portfolio selection opportu-
nities has typically been ignored. An exception is Devereux and Sutherland
(2007b) for the case of two symmetric open economies. The main reason for
3However, in the case of imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods, a
flexible price equilibrium will not replicate first best output. As shown in Paoli (2009), this
implies that the nominal exchange rate should also be included in the optimal monetary
policy rule.
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this omission is that the standard solution techniques do not allow optimiz-
ing agents to take into account information about the risk characteristics of
their asset holdings. The lack of information implies indeterminacy. Specif-
ically, starting from the same initial condition there exists a continuum of
equilibria which all converge to a steady state. In Gali and Monacelli (2005),
determinacy is achieved by making the rather strong assumption of a com-
plete asset markets at the international level with its implication of full risk
sharing.4 In order to achieve, at least empirically, more realistic results
many of today’s state-of-the-art DSGE models (see for instance Smets and
Wouters (2007) or Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Svensson (2008)) follow
Kollmann (2002) in specifying the risk premium as an exogenous stochastic
process. Using a DSGE model for the Swedish economy, So¨derstro¨m (2008)
argues that the risk premium shock has to a large extent induced inefficient
volatility in the economy, pointing to that the benefits of joining monetary
union could be substantial.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze how monetary policy affects
a SOE’s portfolio selection opportunities. We base our analysis on a version
of a sticky price SOE model as in Gali and Monacelli (2005). We extend the
model by making the risk premium and portfolio holdings endogenous in the
case of an incomplete asset markets structure and study welfare results of
monetary policy. Our approach makes use of the solution method for equilib-
rium portfolio holdings advocated in Devereux and Sutherland (2006). This
method allows for portfolio holdings to be determined in a DSGE framework
4This assumption is at odds with the data. Crucini (1999) provides evidence that
risk-sharing across countries is rather limited.
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based on information about the assets’ risk characteristics in the form of the
variance of the stochastic shocks of the model.
Two results stand out from our analysis: First, the risk premium serves
an allocative efficiency role since it provides clearing for the markets for nom-
inal bonds which is used by the agents in order to obtain hedging against
consumption risk. Second, monetary policy improves a SOE’s portfolio selec-
tion opportunities by adopting a policy of strict domestic inflation targeting.
The later result is similar to what is obtained for the study of two symmet-
ric open economies in Devereux and Sutherland (2007b). However, in our
case we show that monetary policy is also able to affect the level of the risk
premium. Moreover, we show that the risk premium is not invariant to pol-
icy changes. Our results are of interest since they contradict the commonly
used policy argument that nominal exchange rate uncertainty and the risk
premium have a negative impact on a country’s welfare. Furthermore, the
results question the validity of the approach of modeling the risk premium
as an exogenous stochastic process as is commonly done in New Keynesian
DSGE models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the
small open economy model. Section 4.3 adapts the solution method devel-
oped in Devereux and Sutherland (2006) for the portfolio holdings and the
risk premium in the SOE. Section 4.4 provides a welfare analysis of portfolio
holdings and studies the impact of monetary policy. Section 4.5 concludes.
Derivations and technical details are given in the appendix.
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4.2 The small open economy model
In this section a small open economy model is set-up. The model is a version
of the New Keynesian model introduced in Gali and Monacelli (2005) with
simplifying assumption about the homogeneity of the world economy. We
allow for endogenous portfolio choice in an incomplete asset markets envi-
ronment using the solution technique developed in Devereux and Sutherland
(2006).
The world economy is modeled as a continuum of infinitesimally small
open economies represented on the unit interval. Since each economy is of
zero measure, its policy decisions have no impact on the rest of the world.
We distinguish between the ’home’ country, which in our environment refers
to a single SOE, and the remaining ’foreign’ economies which together make
up the world economy. For all the SOE economies, we assume identical
preferences, technology and market structure. We further assume that the
productivity shocks for the ’home’ open economy are uncorrelated with those
of the ’foreign’ economy. The financial market structure is represented by a
’home’ nominal bond and ’foreign’ nominal bond markets.
4.2.1 Households
The SOE is populated by a representative household maximizing expected
discounted lifetime utility. It obtains utility from consumption and disutility
from the labor effort. The specific utility function takes the form
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1−ϕt
1− ϕ
)
, (4.1)
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where β is the household’s subjective discount rate satisfying 0 < β < 1, σ
is coefficient of relative risk aversion and ϕ denotes Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. Ct is the composite consumption index defined across all home and
foreign goods, and Nt denotes hours of labor.
The consumption index is defined by
Ct =
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (4.2)
where CH,t and CF,t are indices of consumption of home and foreign pro-
duced goods, 0 < α < 1 is an (inverse) measure of the degree of home bias
in consumption and η is the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign produced goods. The home country aggregate consumer price index
is
Pt =
[
(1− α)(PH,t)1−η + α(PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η . (4.3)
where PH,t and PF,t are the price indices of home and foreign produced
goods respectively.
For a given level of consumption, the domestic household’s demand for
home and foreign consumption goods is given as 5
CH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct ; CF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (4.4)
For given demand functions, the representative household of the home coun-
5Home and foreign aggregate demand function is used to further determine demand
for domestic differentiated good CH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−
CH,t, for country i demand for
foreign consumptions goods Ci,t =
(
Pi,t
PF,t
)−γ
CF,t and for country i demand for foreign
differentiated good Ci,t(j) =
(
Pi,t(j)
Pi,t
)−
Ci,t.
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try faces a budget constraint of the form
PtCt +Wt+1 5 wtNt + Πt + Pt(rH,tΞH,t−1 + rF,tΞF,t−1) (4.5)
where wt denotes the nominal wage, Πt is the total profit generated by mo-
nopolistically competitive home country firms,6 rH,t represents period t real
rate of return on home assets and ΞH,t denotes home country household’s
holdings of domestic assets at period t. Similarly, rF,t and ΞF,t for foreign
assets. Wt is the net value of nominal wealth of the home household and is
defined as
Wt = Pt(ΞH,t−1 + ΞF,t−1). (4.6)
Real rates of return on home (rH,t) and foreign (rF,t) assets are defined as
rH,t = RH,t
Pt−1
Pt
; rF,t = RF,t
P ∗t−1
P ∗t
(4.7)
where P ∗t is the aggregate price level for the foreign economy and RH,t, RF,t
denote respectively nominal rates of return on domestic and foreign assets.
The representative agent’s utility maximization problem yields standard
optimality conditions. The intratemporal condition for consumption-leisure
tradeoff is characterized by
Nϕt C
σ
t =
wt
Pt
. (4.8)
6We assume that the home country consumer is the default owner of the home firms
and hence receives all monopoly profits.
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The stochastic Euler equation is given as
C−σt = βEt(C
−σ
t+1rF,t+1). (4.9)
Finally, optimal portfolio choice implies
EtC
−σ
t+1(rH,t+1 − rF,t+1) = 0. (4.10)
4.2.2 Firms
All goods markets are characterized by monopolistic competition. A typical
firm produces one differentiated final good and all the firms have access to
identical technology. The production function is given as
Yt(j) = AtNt(j), (4.11)
where Yt(j) is the output produced by a firm j in a period t, and At is the
productivity level which follows an AR(1) process given by
logAt = ρa logAt−1 + et (4.12)
where 0 < ρa < 1 and et is an i.i.d. productivity shock with Et−1[et] = 0
and V ar[et] = σ
2
e .
Profit maximizing firms are assumed to set nominal prices according to
a Calvo rule: In each period, only a fraction 1−θ of randomly selected firms
is able to set new prices, hence θ ∈ [0, 1] is an index of price stickiness.7
7See Calvo (1983) for more details on a firm’s optimal price setting strategy.
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All prices are set in terms of producer’s currency. For the firms that are
allowed to reset their prices in period t the optimization problem will be to
maximize the present value of expected discounted future profit stream
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+k
[
Y dt+k
(
PH,t −MCNt+k
)]}
(4.13)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Y dt+k ≤
(
PH,t
P t+k
)−(
CH,t+k +
∫ 1
o
CiH,t+kdi
)
(4.14)
whereQt,t+k ≡ βk(Ct+kCt )−σ( PtPt+k ) is the stochastic discount factor andMCNt+k
denotes the nominal marginal cost. The first order condition for price setting
is given by
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt,t+kYt+k
(
PH,t − 
1− MC
n
t+k
)]
= 0. (4.15)
The solution for PH,t is given as
PH,t =
(

1− 
)
Et
∑∞
k=0 β
kQt,t+kYt+kMC
n
t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 β
kQt,t+kYt+k
(4.16)
Finally, the dynamics of the domestic price index is characterized by the
following expression.
PH,t =
[
θP 1−H,t−1 + (1− θ)P
1−
H,t
] 1
1−
. (4.17)
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4.2.3 Monetary policy
The nominal interest rate is determined by a simple rule which is subject to
stochastic financial markets shocks
RH,t+1 = β
−1
(
PH,t
PH,t−1
)ζ
exp(mt) (4.18)
where mt is i.i.d. stochastic financial shocks assumed to be outside the direct
control of the monetary authority with Et−1[mt] = 0 and V ar[et] = σ2m.
From this equation, we see that monetary policy determines the nominal
rate of return on domestic bonds as a function of the last period’s producer
price inflation rate. The parameter ζ represents the stance of monetary
policy.
4.2.4 The world economy
We assume that all the foreign countries share the same AR(1) technological
process with perfectly correlated productivity shocks. The foreign countries’
productivity shocks are, however, uncorrelated with productivity shocks of
the home country. Foreign countries have common monetary policy (i.e.
form a monetary union), implying that only one foreign nominal bond is
issued in the world economy. Further, in order to simplify our analysis,
stochastic stochastic financial shocks play no role in the world economy.
4.2.5 Domestic market clearing conditions
In order to close the model, we need to impose market clearing conditions
for the domestic labor market, the final goods market and the asset market.
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For the domestic labor market, the representative household labor supply
must equal domestic aggregate labor demand
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di (4.19)
The domestic goods market clearing condition for the differentiated good
j requires that the supply of the good must be equal to the sum of the
demands from the domestic economy and that of the foreign economies
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) +
∫ 1
0
CiH,t(j)di for all j ∈ (0, 1) (4.20)
Where the aggregate production level is determined by the following CES
aggregator:
Yt ≡
[
Yt(j)
1−

] 
1−
(4.21)
Finally, market clearing condition for the domestic asset market requires
ΞH,t + Ξ
∗
H,t = 0 (4.22)
4.3 Solving the model
In general, the model from section 4.2 does not have any analytical solution.
A common approach to dealing with this issue is to derive the solution of the
DSGE model using a first-order (log) linear approximation of the equilibrium
conditions around its deterministic steady state.
A standard solution approach, however, will involve two important com-
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plications for the portfolio decision problem. First, the equilibrium portfolio
will be indeterminate in a first-order linear approximation. The indetermi-
nacy follows as the agents’ portfolio decision is here entirely determined by
the information given by the first moments of the stochastic shocks. Second,
in a deterministic steady state, all portfolio allocations can be regarded as
valid equilibria. Hence, a set of possible approximation points will be avail-
able.
In general these two complications can be overcome. For the first issue,
using a higher-order approximation will make the portfolio decision determi-
nate since the risk characteristics of the assets in the form of higher moments
will be considered. For the second issue, as pointed out in Judd and Guu
(2001), from the set of deterministic steady state portfolio allocations the bi-
furcation point can be selected as a point of approximation. The bifurcation
point represents the unique optimal portfolio allocation when the stochastic
noise of the economy becomes arbitrarily small, and consequently will serve
as a reasonable approximation point.
By making use of these two results, Devereux and Sutherland (2006)
develop a general solution methodology that allows for determining asset
holdings for standard DSGE models. In their methodology, the optimal
portfolio is obtained by a combination of second-order approximation to
the portfolio equilibrium conditions with a first-order approximation to the
solution of the non-portfolio equilibrium conditions. In this approach, the
equilibrium portfolio conditions will only feature cross-products of the en-
dogenous variables, implying that a second-order accurate solution can be
derived using only first-order approximation of the non-portfolio equilibrium
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conditions (see Lombardo and Sutherland (2007)). By applying this results,
we can determine the solution of the steady state portfolio holdings in a
two-step procedure: First, solve the model taking the first-order approxi-
mation of the non-portfolio equilibrium conditions. Second, extract from
this solution the cross products of the variables needed to solve the portfolio
equilibrium conditions.8
4.3.1 The deterministic steady state
As the approximation point for the non-portfolio equilibrium conditions we
choose a symmetric deterministic steady state. Thus, we have (bar over a
variable denotes its steady state value) W = 0, Y = C, PH,t = PF,t = P ,
rH = rF =
1
β , ⇒ rx = 0, Ξ ≡ ΞH = −ΞF .
4.3.2 The log-linearized version of the small open economy
model
Non-portfolio part
A reduced form system for the endogenous variables9 Wˆt, Cˆt, Yˆ
∗
t , χˆt, piH,t, pi
∗
F,t, rˆx,t
of the first-order log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions can
8We must use the steady state portfolio holdings since this is the only variable that will
appear when using a first-order approximation of the non-portfolio equilibrium conditions.
To study dynamic asset holdings, one must combine a third-order approximation to the
portfolio equilibrium conditions with a second-order approximation to the solution of the
non-portfolio equilibrium conditions (see Devereux and Sutherland (2007a)).
9Hat denotes percentage deviation from the steady state value.
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be written as follows (for derivations, see appendix 4.6.1) 10
σ(EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt) = σ(EtYˆ ∗t+1 − Yˆ ∗t ) + (1− α)(Etχˆt+1 − χˆt) +O(2) (4.23)
Wˆt+1 =
1
β
Wˆt + Ξ˜rˆx,t+1 − αχˆt + Yˆt − Cˆt +O(2) (4.24)
Yˆt = (1− α)Cˆt + αYˆ ∗t + η(1− α)αχˆt + γαχˆt +O(2) (4.25)
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λ
[
ϕNˆt + σCˆt + αχˆt − Aˆt − µ
]
+O(2) (4.26)
σ(EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt) + EtpiH,t+1 + α(Etχˆt+1 − χˆt) = ζpiH,t +mt +O(2) (4.27)
pi∗F,t = βEtpi
∗
F,t+1 + λ
[
ϕNˆ∗t + σYˆ
∗
t − Aˆ∗t − µ
]
+O(2) (4.28)
σ(EtYˆ
∗
t+1 − Yˆ ∗t ) + Etpi∗F,t+1 = ζ∗pi∗F,t +O(2) (4.29)
rˆx,t+1 = −(St+1 − EtSt+1) +O(2) (4.30)
where Ξ˜ = Ξ
βY
, bilateral terms of trade are defined as χˆt ≡ PˆF,t − PˆH,t ≡
Pˆ ∗F,t + Sˆt − PˆH,t and St is the nominal exchange rate.
Portfolio part
The second-order log-linear approximation of the portfolio equilibrium con-
ditions can be combined so that in equilibrium the following equations must
hold (for derivation, see appendix 4.6.2):
Covt
[
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 −
Qˆt+1
σ
), (rˆx,t+1)
]
= 0 +O(3) (4.31)
10Note, the term O(n+1) captures all the terms of higher order than n.
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Et(rˆx,t+1) = −1
2
[
Vart(rˆ
2
1,t+1)− Vart(rˆ22,t+1)
]
+ σ
1
2
Covt
[
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 +
Qˆt+1
σ
), (rˆx,t+1)
]
+O(3)
(4.32)
4.3.3 The steady state portfolio holdings and the risk pre-
mium
Subsection (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) provide the necessary information to imple-
ment Devereux and Sutherland (2006)’s two-step procedure. The procedure
will help us to determine the steady state portfolio holdings of nominal as-
sets and the exchange rate risk premium in the SOE.
Step 1: The non-portfolio part
In order to find the solution to the non-portfolio part of the model, we need
to fit the reduced form system of equations to the following first order state
space representation
A1
 st+1
Etct+1
 = A2
st
ct
+A3xt +Bξt +O(2) (4.33)
xt = Nxt−1 + εt where Σ = E(εtε′t)
We start doing this by replacing Ξ˜rˆx,t+1 with ξt+1, where ξt+1 is a zero
mean i.i.d. random variable. The coefficient matrices A1, A2, A3, B and N
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in the state space representation will be specified by setting
s′t =
[
Wˆt
]
c′t =
[
Cˆt, χˆt, Yˆ
∗
t , piH,t, pi
∗
F,t, rˆx,t
]
x′t =
[
Mˆt, Aˆt, Aˆ
∗
t ,
]
ε′t = [mt, et, e
∗
t , ]
N =

0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

Σ =

σ2m 0 0
0 σ2a 0
0 0 σ2a∗

For the parameters of our model, we use the following calibration values:
Parameter Calibration Value
β 0,99
α 0,5
γ 1,5
θ 0,5
ζ 2
η 1,5
σ 1
ϕ 0
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The model will have the first order state space solution of the following form
st+1 = T1xt + T2st + T3ξt +O(
2) (4.34)
ct = P1xt + P2st + P3ξt +O(
2) (4.35)
Step 2: Portfolio part
From the first order state space solution, we extract the following variables
11
rˆx,t+1 = R1ξ +R2ε+O(
2) (4.36)
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 − Qˆt+1) = D1ξ +D2ε+D3X+O(2) (4.37)
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 + Qˆt+1) = F1ξ + F2ε+ F3X+O(
2) (4.38)
(4.36) and (4.37) can be used to find the steady state portfolio holdings
of domestic nominal bonds (for derivation, see appendix 4.6.3)12
Ξ˜ =
[
R2ΣD
′
2R
′
1 −D1R2ΣR′2
]−1
R2ΣD
′
2 +O(
3) (4.39)
(4.36) and (4.38) together with the solution in (4.39) can be used to find
the steady state exchange rate risk premium (for derivation, see appendix
11We can drop the time subscript since a non-time varying covariance matrix Σ will
make the conditional one-period-ahead second moments solution of the model non-time
varying (see property 4 in Devereux and Sutherland (2006)).
12Note that if we let Σ = CΣ0 and let C → 0 (i.e. we get infinitesimally small noise)
the value of Ξ will be arbitrarily close to a deterministic steady state that represents a
bifurcation point. Hence, this will be consistent with using the deterministic steady state
as an approximation point for the non-portfolio variables.
113
4.6.3)
rp =
1
2
R˜2ΣF˜2
′
+O(3) (4.40)
where R˜2 ≡
(
1−R1Ξ˜
)−1
R2 and F˜2 ≡ F1Ξ˜R˜2 + F2
4.4 Welfare analysis of portfolio holdings
4.4.1 Partial equilibrium analysis of portfolio holdings
Before we start analyzing the steady state portfolio holdings and the ex-
change rate risk premium in general equilibrium, it is useful to obtain some
intuition by first performing an analysis of portfolio holdings in a partial
equilibrium setting. We start this by extracting the domestic consumption
and real excess return from the state space solution (see appendix (4.6.4)):13
Cˆt = −0.25mt + 0.71et + 0.29e∗t + 0.010Ξ˜rx,t +O(2) (4.41)
rˆx,t = 0.75mt − 0.57et + 0.57e∗t + 0.020Ξ˜rx,t +O(2) (4.42)
For the convenience of our analysis, suppose initially that the portfolio
share of domestic bond to GDP is zero, i.e. Ξ˜ = 0. From (4.41), we can
see that in response to a interest rate shock of one percentage point the
consumption index will be reduced by 0.25. To be able to hedge against
this effect, the household has incentives to obtain a portfolio holdings that
will generate a positive income stream to offset the impact that the interest
13Note, we have used the steady state value of wealth by setting Wˆt = 0
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rate shock has on consumption. From (4.42) we have that the interest rate
shock will cause an immediate appreciation so that the excess return on
domestic nominal bonds will increase by a factor of 0.75. Consequently, to
insure against consumption risk, gross portfolio holdings are required to take
a long position in domestic nominal bonds financed by a short position in
foreign nominal bonds. However, since the level of portfolio holdings also
influences the terms of trade, an additional effect from changes in portfolio
holdings on the real excess return will take place. In total, it will be the
case that a complete hedge against a productivity shock requires a positive
share in home nominal bonds proportional to 0.25 ·0.75/(0.25 ·0.75+0.752).
The first term in the denominator adjusts for the influence from the terms of
trade, while the remaining part of the expression represents the immediate
effect of the interest rate shock on real excess return. To obtain the optimal
portfolio holdings, the expression must be scaled by a proportionality factor
of 1/0.01. This reflects the fact that the pay-off from a one-period bond is
only transitory and consequently needs to be magnified in order to generate
an income stream that can offset the immediate impact that a structural
shock have on consumption.
By applying similar type of reasoning, a domestic productivity shock
can be fully hedged by a positive portfolio holdings proportional to 0.71 ·
0.57/(2 · 0.71 · 0.57 + 0.572). However, for a foreign productivity shock, the
portfolio holding will in general be indeterminate.14
14The explanation for this is that to hedge against the direct impact of this shock a
negative domestic portfolio holding is demanded. But since a negative portfolio holding
will reduce the effect a foreign productivity shock impact has on the real excess return,
it will reduce the initial impact of hedging. In general, increased demand for domestic
bonds will not be able to catch up with this latter effect making the portfolio holdings
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Suppose now a setting in which the household faces all the uncorrelated
structural shocks simultaneously. The optimal portfolio holdings will be
affected by the relative variance of each of the different structural shocks.
In particular, when the variance of one of the structural shocks increases
relatively to the other structural shocks, the optimal portfolio shares will
move towards the portfolio holdings required to fully hedge against that
shock.15 The intuition is that increased variance of a shock will make the
variance of consumption more exposed to the shock. Hence, the household
is provided with incentives to adjust its portfolio holdings to hedge more
against it.
4.4.2 General equilibrium portfolio holdings and the risk
premium
If the world economy consisted of risk neutral agents the portfolio demands
(discussed in the previous subsection) from SOE would always be met. This
would be the case since foreign agents then would be willing to absorb all
the risk. However, we have assumed that foreign agents are risk averse.
Further, since our SOE setting differs from the analysis for two symmetric
open economies, the portfolio demands from the foreign agents would not
be the same as the demand from the SOE. Hence, since changes in expected
real excess return (i.e. risk premium) provides incentives for changes in
indeterminate.
15This can be shown by setting the exchange rate risk premium equal to zero in the
portfolio selection equation (4.72) in the appendix. Then insert for equation (4.41)
and (4.42) in the remaining expression, solve for the portfolio holdings which gives
1
0.010
0.25·0.75σ2m+0.71·0.57σ2a−0.29·0.57σ2a∗
2(0.25·0.75σ2m+0.71·0.57σ2a)+0.75σ2m+0.572σ2a
.
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portfolio demand it also serves an allocative efficiency role since it provides
market clearing for nominal bonds. In other words it provides an optimal
trade-off between risk (variance) and expected return (mean) for the SOE.
This implies that the general equilibrium portfolio holdings from the
solution to our model can be expressed as
Ξ˜ =
A︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0.19σ2m + 0.41σ
2
a + 0.41σ
2
a∗)
0.010
2(0.19σ2m + 0.41σ2a + 0.41σ2a∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
)+ (0.56σ2m + 0.33σ
2
a + 0.33σ
2
a∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)

(4.43)
The risk premium becomes
rp = 0.5
p′(−0.19σ2m − 0.41σ2a + 0.73σ2a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
+ p′′
(
0.56σ2m + 0.33σ
2
a + 0.33σ
2
a∗
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E

(4.44)
where p′ ≡ (1−0.010Ξ˜)−1 and p′′ ≡ p′20.010Ξ˜ represent two scaling factors.
As such, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) can be expressed as
RH,t −R∗W,t + rp = Et(Sˆt+1 − Sˆt) +O(3) (4.45)
In the expression for domestic nominal bonds (4.43), the term in the
numerator (labeled as A) together with the term in the denominator (labeled
as C), scaled by the proportionality factor 1/0.01, determine the equilibrium
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level of domestic nominal bond holdings given that bond holdings do not
influence the terms of trade. However, since the share of domestic nominal
bonds also influences the terms of trade, the equilibrium level of domestic
nominal bond holdings must be adjusted by the term in the denominator
(labeled as B).
In the expression for the risk premium (4.44), the first term inside the
bracket (p’D) represents the one period ahead covariance between home and
abroad consumption and the real excess return, not taking into account the
income effect the portfolio holdings has on consumption. The expression in
the parenthesis (labeled as D) gives the covariance effect given that nominal
bonds do not influence the terms of trade. The scaling factor p′ adjusts for
the fact that the covariance is influenced by the effect that the bond holdings
have on the terms of trade.
The next term in the bracket (p”E) captures the one period ahead co-
variance between the income effect of portfolio holdings on consumption and
real excess return for the SOE household.16 The expression in the parenthe-
sis (labeled as E) gives the variance of real excess return given that nominal
bonds do not influence the terms of trade. The scaling factor p′′ adjusts for
the effect the level of bond holding has both on the terms of trade and the
income effect of portfolio holdings.
The results demonstrated here question the arguments typically used in
the policy debate, namely that nominal exchange rate uncertainty and the
presence of a risk premium distort the optimal decisions made by the agents
16The implicit assumption in the model of non-discrimination among foreign agents,
implies that there will be no such effect from abroad since bonds supplied by the home
economy will be divided equally among foreign agents.
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in the financial markets. Instead, our analysis implies that financial markets
under a floating exchange rate regime allow the household to adjust its gross
portfolio holdings so that an additional income stream is obtained, having
a positive impact on the expected utility.
4.4.3 Monetary policy influence
A policy of strict inflation targeting is implemented by letting ζ →∞ in the
inflation targeting rule. In general, this will imply that the SOE economy
will replicate its flexible price equilibrium (see for instance, Gali and Mona-
celli (2005)), and thereby making interest rate shocks to have no influence
on the economy and on the equilibrium portfolio decision. For the analy-
sis of two symmetric open economies provided in Devereux and Sutherland
(2007b), it is shown that the elimination of the interest rate shocks in the
economy will enhance the degree of international risk sharing. The result is
due to the fact that, without the presence of interest rate shock, the agents
can concentrate their gross nominal portfolio holdings towards the elimina-
tion of country specific productivity shocks. In our case, the elimination
of interest rate shocks will also improve the insurance opportunities against
consumption risk in the SOE. The intuition behind this result is the follow-
ing: The SOE household will, since hedging against an interest rate shocks
calls for a positive nominal bond holdings (see section 4.4.1), decrease its de-
mand for home nominal bonds. However, since monetary policy in the SOE
has no effects on the world economy, demand for domestic nominal bonds
from the world economy would remain unchanged. Together this implies an
increase in the equilibrium risk premium, for the market clearing conditions
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to be satisfied.
The equilibrium portfolio holdings can be expressed as17
Ξ˜ =
(0.41σ2a + 0.41σ
2
a∗)
0.010
[
2(0.41σ2a + 0.41σ
2
a∗) + (0.33σ
2
a + 0.33σ
2
a∗)
] (4.46)
while the risk premium now becomes
rp = 0.5
[
p′
(−0.41σ2a + 0.73σ2a∗)+ p′′ (0.33σ2a + 0.33σ2a∗)] (4.47)
The property that the risk premium is not invariant to the degree of
interest rate response to inflation is at odds with the practice of many of
today’s state-of-the-art DSGE models, (see for instance Smets and Wouters
(2007) or Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Svensson (2008)) in which the risk
premium is specified as an exogenous stochastic process. As pointed out
in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008), this reduced form specification of
the risk premium has a strong positive impact on the ability of the model
in Smets and Wouters (2007) to fit the aggregate data. This is due to that
variability of the shock to the risk premium is relatively large compared to
the other structural shocks specified in the model.
However, the inclusion of an exogenous shock with the impact of im-
proved aggregate data fit does not itself enhance the reliability of a model
for the purpose of policy analysis. In general an accurate structural model
(i.e. without free parameters) is needed for the evaluation of policy effects.
17The fact that the change in monetary policy shown here does not have any impact
for the effect a domestic productivity shock has on consumption and the terms of trade is
just a result of the calibration values we have selected, made purely to illustrate the main
argument of this section. In general, this will not be the case.
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According to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008), this implies for the
structural shocks that they must satisfy: (1) Invariability with respect to the
policy interventions; (2) the structural shocks must be easily interpretable,
in a sense that it is clear whether shock should be accommodated (good
shock) or offset (bad shock). The results of our analysis prove that the risk
premium is not invariant to policy changes and is efficient with respect the
portfolio selection opportunities of the representative agent. Consequently,
the approach of modeling risk premium as an exogenous random variable
violates both the stated criteria.
4.4.4 Robustness
The specification of our model and the calibration values we use represent a
simplification of an economic system. Much of the simplification was made
in order to clearly illustrate our main results. Still,the allocative efficiency
role of the risk premium and the property that monetary policy will influence
the level of the risk premium will be valid under general parameter values
and in a more general framework of the model.
In fact, it is well known that in a standard setup with a perfect capital
market, deviation from the uncovered interest parity can occur either due to
departure from risk neutrality or from rational expectations or from both.
In our model, we have departed from risk neutrality but not from ratio-
nal expectations. If we depart from rational expectations, agents portfolio
holdings could of course be instrumental in deteriorating their risk sharing
opportunities. In that case modeling the risk premium as an exogenous
stochastic process could serve as a useful approximation. In a real world
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economy it is perhaps the combination of departure both from risk neu-
trality and rational expectations that is most relevant. In such light our
analysis delivers an important message, namely that to be able to judge
how nominal exchange uncertainty contributes to a country’s welfare one
must know how much the risk premium serves an efficient allocative role
and how much can be considered to be caused by behavior that deviates
from rational expectations.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the welfare effects of monetary policy, for
the case of a SOE with endogenous portfolio choice and incomplete asset
markets. We demonstrated that under a floating exchange rate regime with
a monetary policy rule, the risk premium serves an allocative efficiency role,
since it provides market clearing for nominal bonds used by the household
to obtain an optimal trade-off between risk and return. Further, in line with
previous research, the positive welfare effect of portfolio holdings is improved
by the adoption of a strict domestic inflation targeting rule. Moreover, in
our model monetary policy would also impact the level of the risk premium.
We have argued that our results are of interest both from a policy per-
spective and in relation to macroeconomic modeling of an open economy.
Our findings call into question the conventional notion from the policy de-
bate that nominal exchange rate uncertainty and the risk premium having
negative impact on a country’s welfare. Our results also challenge the com-
mon approach of today’s state-of-the-art DSGE models to model the risk
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premium as an exogenous stochastic process.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Non-portfolio equations
The solution of the non-portfolio part of the model is based on a log-linear
first order approximation of the equilibrium conditions of the model.
Household
For the consumption-leisure trade of equation (4.8) this gives us
ϕNˆt + σCˆt = wˆt − Pˆt (4.48)
The intertemporal Euler equation (4.9) is
σCˆt = σEt
[
Cˆt+1 − rˆF,t+1
]
+O(2) (4.49)
The portfolio selection condition (4.10) can be expressed as
Et [rˆH,t+1 − rˆF,t+1] ≡ Etrˆx,t+1 = 0 +O(2) (4.50)
The budget constraint equation (4.5) of the representative household be-
comes
Wˆt+1 =
1
β
Wˆt +
Ξ¯
βY¯
rˆx,t+1 + PˆH,t + Yˆt − Pˆt − Cˆt +O(2) (4.51)
Where Wˆt ≡ WtY .
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Firms
Combining equation (4.16) and (4.17) makes it possible to arrive at
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λ
[
(wˆt − PˆH,t − Aˆt)− µ
]
+O(2) (4.52)
Where µ ≡ 1− and λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ .
Monetary policy
The monetary policy rule (4.18) is given as
RˆH,t+1 = ζ(PˆH,t − PˆH,t−1) +mt (4.53)
The world economy
By using the market clearing condition for the world economy that Cˆ∗t = Yˆ ∗t ,
the Euler equation for the world economy can be expressed as
σYˆ ∗t = σEt
[
Yˆ ∗t+1 − rˆF,t+1 + Qˆt+1 − Qˆt
]
+O(2) (4.54)
Domestic market clearing conditions
Inserting (4.11) into (4.19) and then approximating gives
Yˆt = Aˆt + Nˆt +O(
2) (4.55)
While inserting the domestic demand and foreign demand conditions into
(4.20) and using the aggregator (4.21) implies that we can write
Yˆt = (1−α)Cˆt+αYˆ ∗t −η(1−α)(PˆH,t−Pˆt)−γα(PˆH,t−St−Pˆ ∗F,t)+O(2) (4.56)
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Definitions and identities
To put our model in a simple reduced form specification, we will need to
make use of some steady state identities and definitions.
For the terms of trade, χˆt, we have
χˆt = PˆF,t − PˆH,t = Pˆ ∗F,t + Sˆt − PˆH,t (4.57)
While for the real exchange rate
Qˆt = Pˆ
∗
F,t + Sˆt − Pˆt (4.58)
The real domestic rate of return
rˆH,t = RˆH,t + Pˆt−1 − Pˆt (4.59)
Domestic inflation
piH,t = PˆH,t − PˆH,t−1 (4.60)
The aggregate consumer price index is approximated as
Pˆt = (1− α)PˆH,t + αPˆF,t +O(2) = PˆH,t + α(PˆF,t − PˆH,t) +O(2) (4.61)
Using (4.57) to substitute for (PˆF,t − PˆH,t) in (4.61) gives
Pˆt = PˆH,t + αχˆt +O(
2) (4.62)
Inserting for Sˆt from (4.57) into (4.58) and substitute for (Pˆt − PˆH,t) from
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(4.62) implies that the relationship between the real exchange rate and the
terms of trade can be expressed as
Qˆt = (1− α)χˆt +O(2) (4.63)
Reduced form
For the capital market condition, we can combine (4.49) with (4.54) and
then insert for the terms of trade from (4.63):
σ(EtCt+1 − Ct) = σ(EtYˆ ∗t+1 + Yˆ ∗t ) + (1− α)(Etχˆt+1 − χˆt) +O(2) (4.64)
For the budget constraint, substituting for (Pˆt−PˆH,t) from (4.62) into (4.51)
gives
Wˆt+1 =
1
β
Wˆt +
Ξ¯
βY¯
rˆx,t+1 − αχˆt + Yˆt − Cˆt +O(2) (4.65)
By substituting (4.62) into (4.56), the home market clearing condition can
be written as
Yˆt = (1− α)Cˆt + αYˆ ∗t + η(1− α)αχˆt + γαχˆt +O(2) (4.66)
For home inflation, we can substitute (4.48) and (4.62) into (4.52):
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + λ
[
ϕNˆt + σCˆt + αχˆt − Aˆt − µ
]
+O(2) (4.67)
For the home monetary rule (4.53), we substitute for (4.59) and then for
(4.49), (4.60) and (4.57). Taking the conditional expectation based on in-
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formation from period t makes it possible to express
σ(EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt) + EtpiH,t+1 + α(Etχˆt+1 − χˆt) = ζpiH,t +mt +O(2) (4.68)
For the world economy, world inflation pi∗F,t is given as
pi∗F,t = βEtpi
∗
F,t+1 + λ
[
ϕNˆ∗t + σYˆ
∗
t − Aˆ∗t − µ
]
+O(2) (4.69)
While the monetary policy is stated as
σ(EtYˆ
∗
t+1 − Yˆ ∗t ) + Etpi∗F,t+1 = ζ∗pi∗F,t +O(2) (4.70)
Real excess return on home nominal bonds is given as the negative of the
one period ahead unexpected change in the nominal exchange rate.18 Using
(4.57) to substitute for the nominal exchange rate, this can also be expressed
as the negative of the unexpected change in domestic prices and in the terms
of trade plus the unexpected changes in the foreign price level:
rˆx,t+1 = −(St+1 − EtSt+1) +O(2)
= −
[
(Pˆt+1 − EtPˆt+1)− (Pˆ ∗t+1 − EtPˆ ∗t+1)
]
− [τˆt+1 − Et+1τˆt+1] +O(2)
(4.71)
4.6.2 Portfolio equations
The solution of the portfolio part of the model is based on a log-linear second
order approximation of the portfolio equilibrium conditions.
18In general, this expression will depend only on the exogenous i.i.d. process of the
model, see property 6 in Devereux and Sutherland (2006)
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Home economy portfolio selection equation (4.10) then becomes
Et
[
rˆx,t+1 +
1
2
rˆ2x,t+1 − σCˆt+1rˆx,t+1
]
= 0 +O(3) (4.72)
While for a generic foreign economy i we have
Et
[
rˆx,t+1 +
1
2
rˆ2x,t+1 − σCˆi,∗t+1rˆx,t+1 − Qˆi,t+1rˆx,t+1
]
= 0 +O(3) (4.73)
By combining equation (4.72) with (4.73) and integrating implies we can
express portfolio equilibrium condition as
Et
[
(Cˆt+1 −
∫ 1
0
Cˆi,∗t+1di−
∫ 1
0
Qˆi,t+1
σ
di)rˆx,t+1
]
= 0 +O(3) (4.74)
Et(rx,t+1) = −1
2
[
Et(rˆ
2
1,t+1)− Et(rˆ22,t+1)
]
+ σ
1
2
Et
[
(Cˆt+1 −
∫ 1
0
Cˆi,∗t+1di−
∫ 1
0
Qˆi,t+1
σ
di)rˆx,t+1
]
+O(3)
(4.75)
Since we for the world economy must have that Yˆ ∗t =
∫ 1
0 Cˆ
i,∗
t di and Qˆt+1 =∫ 1
0 Qˆi,t+1di, we can substitute the two conditions into the expressions above:
Et
[
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 −
Qˆt+1
σ
)rˆx,t+1
]
= 0 +O(3) (4.76)
Et(rˆx,t+1) = −1
2
[
Et(rˆ
2
1,t+1)− Et(rˆ22,t+1)
]
+ σ
1
2
Et
[
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 +
Qˆt+1
σ
)rˆx,t+1
]
+O(3)
(4.77)
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If we use the fact that for a first order approximation Et[rˆx,t+1] = 0 , the
last two equations can also be expressed as
Covt
[
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 −
Qˆt+1
σ
), (rˆx,t+1)
]
= 0 +O(3) (4.78)
Et(rˆx,t+1) = −1
2
[Vart(rˆ1,t+1)− Vart(rˆ2,t+1)]
+ σ
1
2
Covt
[
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 +
Qˆt+1
σ
), (rˆx,t+1)
]
+O(3)
(4.79)
4.6.3 Determination of portfolio holdings and expected ex-
cess return
Portfolio
Extracting from the state space solution
rˆx,t+1 = R1ξ +R2ε+O(
2) (4.80)
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 −
Qˆt+1
σ
) = D1ξ +D2ε+D3X+O(
2) (4.81)
Inserting for ξ = Ξ˜rx,t+1 in the two expressions above gives
rˆx,t+1 = R1Ξ˜rx,t+1 +R2ε+O(
2) (4.82)
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 −
Qˆt+1
σ
) = D1Ξ˜rx,t+1 +D2ε+D3X+O(
2) (4.83)
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Solving for rx,t+1 and (Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 − Qˆt+1σ ) gives
rˆx,t+1 = (1−R1Ξ˜)−1R2+O(2) = R˜2+O(2) (4.84)
(Cˆt+1− Yˆ ∗t+1−
Qˆt+1
σ
) = D1Ξ˜R˜2+D2+D3X = D˜2+D3X+O(
2) (4.85)
Inserting (4.84) and (4.85) into the portfolio equilibrium condition (4.74)
and applying the property that Et(X) = 0 implies
Et
[
(Cˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1 −
Qˆt+1
σ
)(rˆx,t+1)
]
= Et[(R˜2)(D˜2)
′] = R˜2ΣD˜′2 = 0+O(
3)
(4.86)
Inserting for R˜2 and D˜2 and solving for the steady state portfolio:
Ξ˜ =
[
R2ΣD
′
2R
′
1 −D1R′2ΣR2
]−1
R2ΣD
′
2 +O(
3) (4.87)
Expected excess return
Extracting from the state space solution
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 +
Qˆt+1
σ
) = F1ξ + F2ε+ F3X+O(
2) (4.88)
Inserting for ξ = Ξ˜rx,t+1 in the expression above
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 +
Qˆt+1
σ
) = F1Ξ˜rx,t+1 + F2ε+ F3X+O(
2) (4.89)
(Cˆt+1 + Yˆ
∗
t+1 +
Qˆt+1
σ
) = F1Ξ˜R˜2+ F2+ F3X = F˜2+ F3X+O(
2) (4.90)
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So the approximated steady state risk premium rp can be calculated as 19
rp = Et(rˆ1,t+1)+Vart(rˆ1,t+1)−(Et(rˆ2,t+1)+Vart(rˆ2,t+1)) = σ1
2
R˜2ΣF˜2
′
+O(3)
(4.91)
4.6.4 State space solution for the portfolio variables
Cˆt
Cˆ∗t
τˆt
piH,t
rˆx,t

=

0.010
0
−0.020
0
0.020

Ξ˜rx,t+

−0.2488 0.7143 0.2857
0 0 1.0000
−0.4975 0.5714 −0.5714
−0.2512 0 0
0.7487 −0.5714 0.5714


mˆt
Aˆt
Aˆ∗t
 (4.92)
19Note, we use the fact that X% ≡ Xt−XX ≈ Xˆt+ 12 Xˆ2t +O(3). Consequently, E(X%,t) ≈
E(Xˆt) +
1
2
Var(Xˆt) +O(
3)
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